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Information theory of firm 
 
Dimitri O. Ledenyov and Viktor O. Ledenyov 
 
Abstract – The article formulates the information theory of firm, introduces the concept 
of firm as an operating system, which controls the firm’s operation by the means of the 
information resources processing, in an analogy with the operating system at a microprocessor in 
the computing devices, represents the director as an information processing element, describes 
the board of directors as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar, 
considers the scientific problem of strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting 
overlapping directors in the boards of directors in the firms in the economic system with the 
induced nonlinearities. We highlight a fact that the director makes the information sensing, 
filtering, processing, resonant absorption, analysis, decision making, strategy creation, hence it 
can be empirically represented as a processing element with the Harvard or von Neumann 
director’s mindset architectures in line with the digital signal processing science. We think that 
the board of directors in corporate governance system can be theoretically represented as the 
electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar with a certain number of 
electronic devices (directors can be modeled as electronic devices with the active antenna 
elements, filters banks, digital signal processors, memory chipsets in agreement with the 
microwave and digital signal processing sciences). We developed the MicroITF operating 
system and software programs, 1) to control the firm operation by the means of the information 
resources processing; 2) to accurately characterize the director’s performance by means of a) the 
filtering of the generated/transmitted/received information by the director into the separate 
virtual channels, depending on the information content, and b) the measurement of the levels of 
signals in every virtual channel with the generated/transmitted/received information by the 
director, in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of 
directors in the firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements process, and 3) to 
create the winning virtuous business strategies by the interlocking interconnecting directors in 
the boards of directors in the firms, using the patented recursive artificial intelligence algorithm. 
JEL code: C0, G21, G24, G30, G32, G34, G38, G39, L1, L4, L11, L25, L60, M2, M16 . 
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb . 
Keywords: information theory of firm, firm business strategy creation, optimal corporate 
governance structures, board of directors composition, interlocking directors networks, boards 
seats accumulation number, information flows measurements, operating systems in computing 





 The foundational principles in the economics and finances in Joseph Penso de la Vega 
(1668, 1996), Mortimer (1765), Bagehot (1873, 1897), von Böhm-Bawerk (1884, 1889, 1921), 
Hirsch (1896), Bachelier (1900), Schumpeter (1906, 1911, 1933, 1939, 1961, 1939, 1947), 
Slutsky (1910, 1915 1923), von Mises (1912), Hayek (1945), Ellis, Metzler (1949), Friedman 
(1953), Baumol (1957), Debreu (1959), Dodd (2014) created an essential theoretical framework 
for a better understanding of economic environmental opportunities and limitations towards the 
possible business activities by the economic agents, making it possible to formulate the modern 
evolutionary theory of firm in Babbage (1832), Ueda (1904, 1937), Marshall (1923), Berle, 
Means (1932a, b), Ohlin (1933), Coase (1937), Barnard (1938, 1948, 1949, 1958), Solow 
(August 1957), Modigliani, Miller (June 1958), Baumol (1959, 1962), Penrose (1959), Marris 
(May 1963), Telser (1963), Williamson (1964, 1975, 1988), Cyert, March (1963, 1992), Fogel 
(1964), Manne (1965), Stigler (1968), Mano (1968-1969, 1970-1971, 1972-1973 1975-1976, 
1978, 1980-1981, 1987, 1994, 1995), Black, Scholes (1973), Black, Cox (1976), Merton (1973, 
1974), Lee (1975), Jensen, Meckling (1976), Jensen, Ruback (1983), Jensen (1986, September-
October 1989, 1993, 2007), Jensen, Murphy (1990), Fama (1980), Fama, Jensen (1983, 1985), 
Demsetz (1983, 1997), Wernerfelt (1984, 1995), Lode Li (1986), Perrow (1986), Hart, Moore 
(1990), Hart (2011), Sterman (2000), Williamson (2002), Kantarelis (2007), Spulber (2009), 
Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O(2013b), where the evolution of the firm includes the three clearly 
identified stages in Chandler (1962, 1977, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005), Chandler, Daems 
(1980): 1) Barriers to entry creation; 2) Strategic boundaries definition, and 3) Limits to growth 
evaluation. The director of firm, who is a Leader, a Catalyst, a Believer, a Visionary, is elected 
or appointed to the board of directors to achieve the firm’s strategic business goals during the 
evolution of enterprise in Armstrong (1977, 2006). As we know, there are the two main 
conditional classifications of directors types: 1) Director-Leader, who introduces the leadership 
attributes such as being inspirational and visionary in Covey (2004), De Vries (2006), Heyden 
(2006), Galunic (2006), Nicholson (2007), Rao (2007), Kirkbride (2007), Emmerik (2009), 
Wendt, Euwema, van Emmerik (2009), Kozlowski (2009), Eisen (2010), Pietersen (2010); 2) 
Director-Manager, who performs the management of enterprise in Dai (2007), Fryer (2009). In 
the numerous founded firms in the competitive industrial clusters in Porter (2008), there are the 
one- and two-tier directors’ boards systems in Postma, van Ees (2001) with the interlocking 
interlinking interconnecting directors’ networks in Dooley (1969), Mariolis (1975), Bunting 
(1976), Burt (1980), Pennings (1980), Mintz, Schwartz (1981), Schoorman, Bazerman, Atkin 
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(1981), Palmer (1983), Ornstein (1984), Meeusen, Cuyvers (1985), Stearns, Mizruchi (1986), 
Mizruchi, Stearns (1988), Mizruchi (1996), Postma, van Ees (2001) Rommens, Cuyvers, Deloof 
(November 2007), Santella, Drago, Polo, Gagliardi (2009), Uddin (2012). In this empirical 
condensed research essay, the authors would like to do the following things: 1) to create the 
information theory of the firm, 2) to review the interconnecting interlocking directors networks 
configurations in the boards of directors of publicly traded and non-traded firms, and 3) to 
research the strategy creation problem by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the 
boards of directors in the firms during the strategic governance of firms in the challenging time, 
when the innovation breakthrough processes originate the creative innovative disruptions 
appearances during the capitalism evolution in Schumpeter (1911, 1939, 1947), Christensen 
(Christensen (June 16, 1977; Fall, 1992a, b; 1997; 1998; December, 1998; April, 1999a, b, c; 
1999a, b; Summer, 2001; June, 2002; 2003; March, April, 2003; January, 2006), Bower, 
Christensen (January, February, 1995; 1997; 1999), Christensen, Armstrong (Spring, 1998), 
Christensen, Cape (December, 1998), Christensen, Dann (June, 1999), Christensen, Tedlow 
(January, February, 2000), Christensen, Donovan (March, 2000; May, 2010), Christensen, 
Overdorf (March, April, 2000), Christensen, Bohmer, Kenagy (September, October, 2000), 
Christensen, Craig, Hart (March, April, 2001), Christensen, Milunovich (March, 2002), Bass, 
Christensen (April, 2002), Anthony, Roth, Christensen (April, 2002), Kenagy, Christensen (May, 
2002; 2002), Christensen, Johnson, Rigby (Spring, 2002), Hart, Christensen (Fall, 2002), 
Christensen, Verlinden, Westerman (November, 2002), Shah, Brennan, Christensen (April, 
2003), Christensen, Raynor (2003), Burgelman, Christensen, Wheelwright (2003), Christensen, 
Anthony (January, February, 2004), Christensen, Anthony, Roth (2004), Christensen, Baumann, 
Ruggles, Sadtler (December, 2006), Christensen, Horn, Johnson (2008), Christensen, Grossman, 
Hwang (2009), Dyer, Gregersen, Christensen (December, 2009; 2011), Christensen, Talukdar, 
Alton, Horn (Spring, 2011), Christensen, Wang, van Bever (October, 2013)). The authors will 
apply the sophisticated econometrical econophysical techniques with the purpose to accurately 
characterize the firm within the information theory of the firm, achieving the strategic research 
goals in Schumpeter (1906, 1933), Bowley (1924), Fogel (1964), Box, Jenkins (1970), Grangel, 
Newbold (1977), Van Horne (1984), Taylor S (1986), Tong (1986, 1990), Judge, Hill, Griffiths, 
Lee, Lutkepol (1988), Hardle (1990), Grangel, Teräsvirta (1993), Pesaran, Potter (1993), 
Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, Hendry (1993), Hamilton (1994), Karatzas, Shreve (1995), 
Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay (1997), Rogers, Talay (1997), Hayashi (2000), Durbin, Koopman 
(2000, 2002, 2012), Ilinski (2001), Greene (2003), Koop (2003), Davidson, MacKinnon (2004), 
Cameron, Trivedi (2005), Vialar, Goergen (2009). 
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Review of literature toward accurate characterization of directors in 
interconnecting interlocking overlapping directors’ networks 
in boards of directors in theory of firm 
 
Let us make a chronological literature review to accurately characterize both the directors 
and the interconnecting interlocking overlapping directors’ networks in the boards of directors 
in the theory of firm, aiming to create a coherent picture on a range of the researched problems, 
the obtained research results and the progress made in the field of our research interest. The 
authors would like to higlight the fact that the research on the firm (the business enterprise) was 
in the scope of responsibilities by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the USA for a 
long time in Mitchell (February 7 1921). We would like to begin with the important fundamental 
research in the economics in Brandeis (1915, 1933). The corporate managers’ functions, 
modern corporation structures and private property meaning have been considered in Berle 
(1932), Berle, Means (1932). The problems on the business administration have been uncovered 
in Selznick (1949, 1957). The nature of business elite’s power has been described in Mills 
(1956). The issues such as the critical evaluation of corporate director, the boards of directors 
possible structures and the corporate strategy creation have been considered in Vance (1964, 
1968, 1983). A series of research articles by Williamson (1964, 1975, 1984, December 1985, 
1988, 1996, 2002, 2007) has been focused on the corporate governances problems in the theory 
of firm. The topics on the board of directors and effective management in the firm have been 
discussed in Koontz (1967). Travers (1968), Dooley (1969) researched the interlocks in the 
corporate management. The research on the state in the capitalist society has been presented in 
Miliband (1969). The power and functions of the boards of directors from the theoretical 
synthesis point of view have been studied in Zald (1969). The higher circles have been described 
in Domhoff (1970). Bunting, Barbour (Autumn 1971), Bunting (1976) presented a study on the 
interlocking directorates in large American corporations, 1896 - 1964. The directors, board of 
directors and president have been precisely characterized in Mace (1971, 1986), Mace (March-
April 1972). Child (1972) focused his research on the organizational structure, environment and 
performance. The formation of the sphere of influence has been discussed in Levine (1972). The 
theory of organization has been formulated in Pfeffer (1972, 1973, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987, 
1991), Pfeffer, Salancik (1978, 2003). Bacon (1973, 1993) discussed the corporate directorship 
practices, the corporate boards problems and the corporate governance issues. Blumberg (1973) 
presented his reflections on the proposals for the corporate reform through change in the 
composition of the board of directors. Granovetter (1973) highlighted the strength of weak ties. 
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The economic theory of agency has been formulated in Ross (1973). Allen (1974) described the 
interlocking corporate directorates. Doreian (1974) presented his thoughts on the connectivity of 
social networks. Zeitlin (1974) discussed the problems on the corporate ownership and control. 
Mariolis (1975) studied the interlocking directorates in the corporations. Buchmann (1976) 
researched the organization related problems. Burt (1976, 1983) characterized the social 
networks, co-optations principles, and corporations. Cuyvers, Meeusen (1976, 1985) discussed 
the networks of corporate power in Belgium. Wilson (1976) researched the unlocking interlocks. 
Hughes, John, Mackenzie (1977) characterized the trends in interlocking directorships. Freeman 
(1979a, b) presented his vision on the social networks. The boards of directors in English and 
American companies through 1920 in time of the formation of the big enterprises in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries have been researched in Karjala (1979). Koenig, Gogel, Sonquist (1979) 
created the models of the significance of interlocking corporate directorates. Mokken (1979) 
investigated the cliques, clubs and clans nature in the society. Andrews (November-December 
1980) studied the directors' responsibility for corporate strategy. Andrews (May-June 1981a) 
researched the board's role in formulating strategy.  Andrews (Nov-Dec 1981b) characterized the 
creation of the corporate strategy as a vital function of the board. Burt (1980) presented a 
reconsideration of interlocking directorates, involving American manufacturing, in frames of the 
cooptive corporate actor networks. Burt (1997) highlighted the contingent value of social 
capital. Pennings (1980) characterized precisely the interlocking directorates. Provan (1980) 
investigated the board power and the organizational effectiveness among the human service 
agencies. Radcliff (1980) presented an analysis of the impact of the internal structure of the 
capitalist class on the lending behavior of banks, considering the banks and corporate lending 
problems. Boje, Whetten (1981) investigated the interorganizational networks. Linderberger, 
Ross (1981) researched the industrial organizations. The characterization of the interlocking 
directorates in American businesses has been done in Mintz, Schwartz (1981, 1985). The 
interlocking directors networks in American corporations have been researched in Mizruchi, 
Bunting (1981), Mizruchi (1982, 1983, 1992, 1996), Stearns, Mizruchi (1986), Mizruchi, 
Schwartz (editors) (1987), Mizruchi, Stearns (1988, 1994), Byrd, Mizruchi (2005). Schoorman, 
Bazerman, Atkin (1981) studied the interlocking directorates. Hirsch (1982) considered the 
culture of interlocking directorates. Mariolis, Jones (1982) discussed the centrality in the 
corporate interlock networks. Andrews (1983) highlighted the directors’ responsibility for the 
corporate strategy, researching the strategic management. Barnes (1983) formulated the graph 
theory in the network analysis. Bazerman, Schoorman (1983) created a limited rationality model 
of interlocking directorates. Burt (1983) considered the corporate profits and the cooptation. 
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Burt (2000) studied the network structure of social capital in his research in the field of the 
organizational behavior. Dodd, Warner (1983) wrote a research work on the corporate 
governance. Donaldson, Lorsch (1983) researched the decision-making techniques at the top to 
shape the strategic direction. Fama, Jensen M C(1983b) studied the separation of ownership and 
control. McAvoy, Conter, Dona, Peck (1983) considered the proposals for the increased control 
on the corporation by the board of directors in frames of their econometric analysis research. 
Palmer (1983) investigated the interlocking directorates and the inter-corporate coordination. 
Roy (1983) documented the interlocking directorate structure in the United States. Tashakori, 
Boulton (1983) looked at the board's role in the strategic planning. Vance (1983) accessed the 
corporate leadership at the boards and directors levels. American Bar Association (1984) 
presented its vision on the interlocking directorates. American Bar Association (2011) made 
some additional comments on the interlocking directorates. Caswell (1984) presented an 
institutional perspective on the corporate control and the network of interlocking directorates. 
Hambrick, Mason (1984) studied the organization as a reflection of its top managers. Lease, 
McConnell, Mikkelson (1984) researched the market value of differential voting rights in the 
closely held corporations. Ornstein (1984) considered the interlocking directorates in Canada. 
Scott, Griff (1984) reviewed the British corporate networks 1904–1976. Tricker (1984) made a 
research on the corporate governance. Tricker (1994a) considered the cases in the international 
corporate governance. Tricker (1994b) made an international review on the corporate 
governance. Tricker (2000) documented the history of management thought, researching the 
corporate governance. Tricker (2009) studied the principles, policies and practices toward the 
corporate governance. Useem (1984) wrote a research on the inner circle. Ziegler (1984) 
investigated the people integration network in the Austrian firms. Baysinger, Butler (1985) 
studied the corporate governance and the board of directors, focusing on the performance 
effects of changes in the board composition. Baysinger, Hoskisson (1990) researched the 
composition of the boards of directors and strategic control, paying attention to the corporate 
strategy. Baysinger, Kosnik, Turk (1991) considered the effects of board and ownership structure 
on the corporate R&D strategy. Bearden, Mintz (1985) studied the regionality and integration in 
the American interlock network of corporate power. Chaganti, Mahajan, Sharma (1985) 
considered the corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry. 
Charreaux, Pitol-Belin (Novembre 1985) created the contractual theory of organizations, 
applying his findings to the board of directors of French firms. Charreaux, Couret, Joffre, 
Koenig, De Montmorillon (1987) reviewed the new theories to manage the firm. Charreaux, 
Pitol-Belin (1989) characterized the boards of directors in France. Charreaux, Pitol-Belin 
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(1990) researched the boards of directors in France. Charreaux, Pitol-Belin (October 1991) 
considered the board of directors as a scene of confrontation between the managers and the 
shareholders. Charreaux (October 1993) researched the board of directors as a mechanism 
inside the corporate governance system. Charreaux, Debrieres (1998) considered the corporate 
governance issues. Charreaux (2000) studied the board of directors from the corporate 
governance perspective. Charreaux (2002a) investigated the financial aspects in the corporate 
governance problem. Charreaux (2002b) considered a shareholder as a shareholder of cognitive 
resources. Cochran, Wood, Jones (1985) made the research on the composition of the boards of 
directors and the incidence of golden parachutes. Demsetz, Lehn (1985) accessed the structure 
of corporate ownership, deriving the possible causes and consequences. Demsetz, Villalonga 
(2001) described the ownership structure and evaluated the corporate performance. 
Galaskiewicz, Wasserman, Rauschenbach, Bielefeld, Mullaney (1985) estimated the influence of 
the corporate power, social status, and market position on the corporate in a regional network. 
Meeusen, Cuyvers (1985) investigated the interaction between the interlocking directorships, the 
economic behaviour of companies, researching the networks of corporate power in the ten 
countries. Stockman, Wasseur (1985) accessed the national networks of corporate power by the 
means of comparative analysis of ten countries in 1976. Stockman, Ziegler, Scott (editors) 
(1985) edited a collection of research papers on the networks of corporate power in the ten 
countries in 1976. Stockman, van der Knoop, Wasseur (1990) focused their research attention on 
the interlocking directorships and corporate networks in the Netherlands in the period 1960-
1980. Waldo (1985) investigated the boards of directors with their changing roles, structure and 
information needs. Anderson (1986) characterized the new corporate directors. Norburn (1986) 
compared the directors in the firms and evaluated the industry performance. Shleifer, Vishny 
(1986) wrote a well known research paper on the large shareholders and the corporate control. 
Shleifer, Vishny (1997) conducted a survey of corporate governance. Tirole (1986) Hierarchies 
and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Aghion, Tirole (1997) identified the 
formal and real authority in the organizations. Tirole (2001) researched the corporate 
governance problems. Tirole (2006) created the theory of corporate finance. Grossman, Hart 
(1986) estimated the cost and benefit of ownership in the theory of vertical and lateral 
integration. Glatthard (1987) characterized the state of development of firms in Switzerland in 
1929 - 1983. Kosnik (1987) conducted a study on the board performance in the corporate 
governance. Richardson (1987) characterized the directorship interlocks and the corporate 
profitability. Mathile (1988) presented a business owner's perspective on the outside boards. 
Hermalin, Weisbach (1988) described the determinants of board composition. Weisbach (1988) 
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discussed the outside directorships and the CEO turnover problems. Hermalin, Weisbach (1991) 
discussed the effects of the board composition and direct incentives on the firm performance. 
Hermalin, Weisbach (1998) researched the endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO. Hermalin, Weisbach (2001, 2003) presented a survey of the economic 
literature on the board of directors as an endogenously determined institution. Hermalin, 
Benjamin (2005) described the trends in the corporate governance. Hill, Snell (1988) presented 
their research on the external control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in the research 
intensive industries. Kesner (1988) compiled a list of the directors’ characteristics during his 
investigation of the directors’ type, occupation, tenure and gender. Zahra, Stanton (1988) 
stressed on the possible implications of the board of directors composition on the corporate 
strategy and performance. Zahra, Pearce (1989) conducted a review and created an interactive 
model of the boards of directors and the corporate financial performance interdependence. 
Zahra (1990) highlighted an increasing necessity for the board's involvement in the strategy 
formulation in the firm. Pearce, Zahra (1991) described the relative power of the CEOs and the 
boards of directors, making some associations with the corporate performance. Pearce, Zahra 
(1992) described the board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. Zajac (1988) 
conducted a test of the critical assumptions on the interlocking directorates as an inter-
organizational strategy. Zajac, Westphal (1996) discussed the director reputation, CEO-board 
power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Connors (1989) characterized the outside board 
members as a breath of fresh air in the firm. Fosberg (1989) researched the outside directors 
influence on the managerial monitoring in the firm. Lorsch, MacIver (1989) documented the 
reality of America’s corporate boards. Lundstrom, Ottoson (1989) discussed the bank-industry 
relations in Sweden, including the problems of the ownership and the interlocking directorates. 
Nelson (1989) studied the strength of strong ties, considering the social networks and intergroup 
conflict in organizations. Rechner, Dalton (1989) evaluated the impact of CEO as board 
chairperson on the corporate performance. Rechner, Dalton (1991) presented a longitudinal 
analysis on the CEO duality and the organizational performance. Schellenger, Wood, Tashakori 
(1989) researched the board of director composition, shareholder wealth and dividend policy. 
Singh H, Harianto (1989) studied the management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the 
adoption of golden parachutes. Carver (1990) focused his research on the boards that make a 
difference. Carver (2002) researched the corporate boards that create value for the company. 
Donaldson (1990) contributed to the organizational economics and management theory. 
Donaldson, Davis (1991) studied the agency theory, accenting his attention on the CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. Gilson (1990) collected the evidences on the changes in the 
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corporate ownership and control, when firms default. Glaus (1990) researched the control of the 
firms by the Swiss boards of directors. Kaplan, Reishus (1990) analyzed the outside 
directorships and corporate performance. Kaplan (1994a) evaluated the top executives rewards 
and firm performance, making a comparison of Japan and the United States. Kaplan (1994b) 
considered the top executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany. Kaplan, Minton 
(1994) studied the problems, connected with the appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards. 
Kaplan (1997) researched the corporate governance and corporate performance, comparing 
Germany, Japan and the U.S. Lorsch, MacIver (1989) described the reality of America's 
corporate boards. Powell (1990) researched the networks form of organizations. Rosenstein, 
Wyatt (1990) characterized the outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. 
Rosenstein, Wyatt (1994) described the shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one 
corporation joins the board of directors of another. Rosenstein, Wyatt (1997) looked into the 
inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth problems. Barnhart, Rosenstein 
(1998) considered the board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance. Burris 
(1991) studied the director interlocks and the political behavior of corporations and corporate 
elites. Davis (1991) researched the spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network. 
Davis, Greve (1997) documented the corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 
1980s. Davis, Yoo, Baker (2002) created the network topography of the American corporate elite 
1982-2001. Davis, Yoo, Baker (2003) investigated the small world of American corporate elite, 
1982-2001. Davis, Yoo, Vast (December 2003) characterized a small world of big corporations. 
Goodstein, Boeker (1991) proposed the new perspectives on the governance structure changes 
and the strategic change. Israel (1991) described the capital structure and the market for 
corporate control. Israel (1992) wrote on the capital and ownership structures, and the market 
for corporate control. Byrd, Hickman (1992) answered the question: Do outside directors 
monitor managers? Daily, Dalton (1992) established a relationship between the governance 
structure and the corporate performance in the entrepreneurial firms. Daily, Dalton (1993) 
focused on the board of directors leadership and structure, considering the control and 
performance implications. Daily, Dalton (1994a) researched the corporate governance 
problems, describing an impact of the board composition and structure. Daily, Dalton (1994b) 
made an empirical assessment of the corporate governance and the bankrupt firm. Daily (1995) 
investigated the relationship between the board composition and the leadership structure and 
bankruptcy reorganization outcomes. Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand (1996) completed a review and 
presented a research agenda on the boards of directors. Daily, Dalton (1997) described the CEO 
and board chair roles, held jointly or separately. Daily, Johnson (1997) conducted a 
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longitudinal assessment on the sources of the CEO power and the firm financial performance. 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, Johnson (1998) made the meta-analytic reviews of board composition, 
leadership structure, and financial performance. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand (1999) 
completed a meta-analysis on the research issues such as a number of directors and the financial 
performance of firm. Daily, Dalton, Cannella (2003) described the decades of dialogue and data 
on the corporate governance. Dalton, Daily, Certo, Roengpitya (2003) prepared the meta-
analyses of the financial performance and equity. Daily, Dalton (2005) accurately characterized 
the boards of directors, utilizing the empirical evidence in the practical prescriptions 
development. Demb, Neubauer (1992a) listed the confronting the paradoxes in the corporate 
boards. Demb, Neubauer (1992b) defined the “job” of the board of directors. Finkelstein (1992) 
accurately characterized the power in the top management teams, considering the dimensions, 
measurement, and validation issues. Finkelstein, D’Aveni (1994) explained the problem: How do 
the boards of directors balance the entrenchment avoidance and the unity of command? 
Finkelstein, Mooney (2003) answered the question: How can the board process be used to make 
the boards better? Fligstein, Brantley (1992) solved the problem: Who controls the large 
modern corporation?, considering the bank control, owner control, and organizational dynamics 
issues. Fligstein (1995) precisely characterized the networks of power or the finance conception 
of control, commenting on the Palmer, Barber, Zhou, and Soysal conceptual proposal. Gerlach 
(1992) completed a blockmodel analysis on the Japanese corporate network. Judge, Zeithaml 
(1992) proposed the institutional and strategic choice perspectives on the board involvement in 
the strategic decision making process. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, Davidson (1992) conducted the 
research on the board composition and shareholder wealth in the case of management buyouts. 
Davidson, Pilger, Szakmary (1998) described the golden parachutes, board and committee 
composition and shareholder wealth. Judge, Zeithaml (1992) suggested the institutional and 
strategic choice perspectives on the board involvement in the strategic decision process. Lincoln, 
Gerlach, Takahashi (1992) characterized the Keiretsu networks in the Japanese economy. 
Lipton, Lorsch (1992) made a modest proposal for the improved corporate governance. Mallette, 
Fowler (1992) provided the characterization of the effects of board composition and stock 
ownership of the adoption of “poison pills”. Milgrom, Roberts (1992) wrote about the 
organization and management. Ottoson (1992) made the research on the network analysis and 
interlocking directorships in Sweden. Pearce, Zahra (1992) argued about the board composition 
options from a strategic contingency perspective. Pettigrew (1992) studied the managerial elites. 
Pettigrew, McNulty (1995) researched the power and influence in and around the boardroom. 
McNulty, Pettigrew (1999) described a role of the strategists in the board. Pye, Camm (2003) 
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concentrated on the non-executive directors’ study. Pye, Pettigrew (2005) researched the board 
context, process and dynamics, identifying some challenges for the future. Smith, Watts (1992) 
wrote on the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation 
policies. Wang, Dewhirst (1992) characterized the boards of directors and stakeholder 
orientation. Alexander, Fennel, Halpern (1993) described the board-CEO relations and 
organizational growth and decline. Coulson-Thomas (1993) worked on the problem of 
excellence creation in the boardroom. Jensen M C (1993) characterized the modern industrial 
revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Johnson, Hoskisson, Hitt (1993) 
researched the board of directors' involvement in restructuring, focusing on the effects of board 
control versus the managerial control. Johnson, Greening (1999) described the effects of 
corporate governance and institutional ownership types on the corporate social performance. 
Haunschild (1993) documented the impacts of the interlocks on the corporate acquisition 
activity. Haunschild, Beckman (1998) considered the alternate sources of information and the 
interlock influence. Kester (1993) studied the perspectives and challenges of introduction of the 
directors from banks into the boardroom in Germany, Japan and the United States. Mangel, 
Singh H (1993) researched the ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation 
in large US corporations. Millstein (1993) described the evolution of the certifying board. 
Shivdasani (1993) characterized the board composition, ownership structure and hostile 
takeovers. Shivdasani, Yermack (1999) conducted an empirical analysis on the CEO involvement 
in the selection of new board members. Barnhart, Marr, Rosenstein (1994) evaluated the firm 
performance and board composition, presenting some new evidences. Barnhart, Rosenstein 
(1998) completed an empirical analysis on the board composition, managerial ownership and 
firm performance. Beatty, Zajac (1994) conducted a study on the executive compensation, 
ownership and board structure in the initial public offerings. Boyd (1994) studied the board 
control and CEO compensation. Boyd (1996) listed the determinants of US outside director 
compensation. Brickley, Coles, Terry (1994) researched the outside directors and the adoption of 
poison pills issues. Brickley, Coles, Jarrell (1997) considered the leadership structure, 
separating the CEO and the Chairman of the board. Brickley, Coles, Linck (1999) answered the 
question: What happens to CEOs after they retire?, presenting the new evidences on the career 
concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Gales, Kesner (1994) conducted an analysis of 
the board of directors size and composition in the bankrupt organizations. Goodstein, Gautam, 
Boeker (1994) documented the effects of the board size and diversity on the strategic change. 
Hirshleifer, Thakor (1994) considered the managerial performance, boards of directors, and 
takeover bidding. Huse (1994) described the board-management relations in small firms, 
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describing the paradox of the simultaneous in-dependence and inter-dependence. Huse (2005) 
proposed a framework for exploring the behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. 
Huse, Minichilli, Shoning (2005) described the corporate boards as an asset in the new Europe, 
elaborating on the value of process-oriented boardroom dynamics. Huse (2007) conducted 
research on the boards, governance and value creation in the firms. Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, 
Huse, Van Den Bosch, Volberda (2009) presented a literature review and a research agenda on 
the boards of directors' contribution to the strategy. Van Ees, Gabrielsson, Huse (2009) 
complemented the behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance. Krackhardt (1994) 
considered the graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations in the frames of 
discussion on the computational organization theory. Li (1994) completed a multi-country test of 
the agency theory predictions, considering the ownership structure and the board composition. 
Scott, Kleidon (1994) evaluated the CEO performance, board types and board performance, 
researching the corporate governance issues. Wasserman, Galaskiewicz (1994) described the 
present advances in the social network analysis. Wasserman, Faust (1994) provided some 
information on the methods and applications toward the social network analysis. Wasserman, 
Faust, Iacobucci (1994) researched the social network analysis problems. Bathala, Rao (1995) 
proposed an agency theory perspective on the determinants of board composition. Benassi 
(1995) described the governance factors in a network process approach. Blair (1995) considered 
the ownership and control problems, rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first 
century. Blair (1999) researched the firm-specific human capital and the theories of the firm. 
Blair, Stout (1999) created a team production theory of corporate law. Blair, Stout (2001) 
highlighted the director accountability and the mediating role of the corporate board. Blair, 
Stout (2006) investigated the specific investments and the corporate law. Boyd (1995) suggested 
a contingency model to describe the CEO duality and the firm performance. Hallock (January 
1995) considered the executive pay level and the reciprocal interlocking boards of directors 
problems. Hart (1995) discussed the corporate governance, presenting some theories and 
implications. Hill (1995) discussed the social organization of boards of directors. Kini, Kracaw, 
Mian (1995) provided an unbiased view on the corporate takeovers, firm performance, and 
board composition. Klein (1995) conducted an examination of board committee structures. Klein 
(1998) investigated the firm performance and the board committee structure. Klein (2002) 
researched the audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. 
Lorsch (January- February 1995) investigated the problem of the boards empowering in the 
firms. Moerland (1995) paid his research attention to the alternative disciplinary mechanisms in 
different corporate systems. Moerland (1997) reviewed the theories and practices on the 
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corporate governance from the international perspective. Moerland (1999) explained the 
corporate supervision details in the Netherlands. Monks, Minow (1995) discussed the corporate 
governance issues. O'Neal, Thomas (1995) researched the directors networks and director 
selection problems, emphasizing the board's strategic role in the firm. Pfannschmidt (1995) 
described the multiple directorship appointments in the German firms. Wunderer (1995) 
researched the characteristics of the board’s president, presenting the point of view on this 
research problem from Switzerland. Agrawal, Knoeber (1996) characterized the firm 
performance and described the mechanism to control the agency problems between the 
managers and the shareholders. Agrawal, Knoeber (2001) answered the question: Do some 
outside directors play a political role? Agrawal, Chen (2010) described the determinants and 
consequences of disputes, involving directors in the boards of directors. Bainbridge (1996) 
provided some information on the participatory management within a theory of the firm. 
Bainbridge (2003a), speaking on the director primacy, focused on the means and ends of 
corporate governance. Bainbridge (2003b) presented the board as a nexus of contracts. Beasley 
(April 1996) conducted an empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and the financial statement fraud. Beasley, Salterio (2001) characterized the 
relationship between the board characteristics and the voluntary improvement in the audit 
committee composition and experience. Bhagat, Black (May 10-11 1996) discussed the question: 
Do independent directors matter? Bhagat, Black (1998, 1999) discussed an uncertain 
relationship between the board composition and the firm performance. Bhagat, Black (2000) 
looked into the issues of the board independence and long-term firm performance. Bhagat, Black 
(2002) found a non-correlation between the board independence and the long-term firm 
performance. Bhagat, Black, Blair (2004) accessed the relational investing and the firm 
performance. Bhagat, Bolton (2008) discussed the problems of the corporate governance and the 
firm performance. Black, Jang, Kim (2003) answered the question: Does corporate governance 
predict firms' market values?, using some evidences from Korea. Black, Jang, Kim (2006a) 
provided his research opinion on the problem: Does corporate governance affect firms' market 
values?, applying the evidences from Korea. Black, Jang, Kim (2006b) made the prediction on 
the firms' corporate governance choices, employing the evidences from Korea. Black, Khanna 
(2007) raised the question: Can the corporate governance reforms increase the firms' market 
values?, using the evidences from India. Black, Kim (2008, 2011) characterized the effect of the 
board structure on the firm value in an emerging market with the evidences from Korea. Black, 
Kim, Jang, Park (2011) considered the problem: How corporate governance affects the firm 
value, using the evidences from Korea. Bianco, Gola, Signorini (1996) has been interested in the 
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problem on the dealing with the separation between the ownership and the control in the firm, 
including: state, family, coalitions and pyramidal groups in Italian corporate governance. 
Bianco, Pagnoni (March 1997) researched the interlocking directorates across the listed 
companies in Italy in the case of banks. Booth, Deli (1996) worked on the factors, affecting the 
number of outside directorships, held by the CEOs. Booth, Deli (1999) wrote an article on the 
characterization of the executives of financial institutions as the outside directors. Borokhovich, 
Parrino, Trapani (1996) considered the outside directors and CEO selection problem. De Cecco, 
Ferri (1996) described the commerce banks in Italy. Doz (1996) described the evolution of 
cooperation in the strategic alliances. Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand (1996) presented a review and 
research agenda on the board of directors. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1996, 
1998) considered the law and finance issues. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997) 
defined the legal determinants of external finance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1998, 
1999) reviewed the corporate ownership around the world. Mueller (1996) anchored the points 
for the corporate directors to think about. O'Neal, Thomas (1996) considered the problem of the 
strategic board development. Park, Rozeff (1996) described the role of outside shareholders, 
outside boards, and management entrenchment in the CEO selection. Romano (1996) 
investigated the corporate law and corporate governance. Sundaramurthy (1996) focused on the 
corporate governance within the context of antitakeover provisions. Sundaramurthy, Mahoney J 
M, Mahoney J T (1997) described the board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder 
wealth. Yermack (1996) emphasized the fact that the higher market valuation of companies with 
a small board of directors is frequently observed. Shivdasani, Yermack (1999) discussed the 
CEO involvement in the selection of new board members in the completed empirical analysis. 
West (1996) wrote an introduction to the graph theory. Windolf, Beyer (1996) discussed the 
corporate networks in Germany and Britain in the conditions of co-operative capitalism. Windolf 
(2002) presented the research on the corporate networks in Europe and the United States. 
Windolf (2009) investigated the coordination and control in the corporate networks in the United 
States and Germany, 1896-1938. Angbazo, Narayanan (1997) researched the top management 
compensation and the structure of the board of directors in commercial banks. Bacon, Cornett, 
Davidson (1997) discussed the research problems on the board of directors and the dual-class 
recapitalizations in the firms. Brickley, Coles, Jarrell (1997) researched the leadership 
structures with the separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors. Cotter, 
Shivdasani, Zenner (1997) answered the question: Do independent directors enhance the target 
shareholder wealth during the tender offers? Davis, Schoorman, Donaldson (1997) presented a 
research toward a stewardship theory of management. Davies, Gower (1997) outlined the 
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Gower's principles of company law. Fernandez, Gomez, Fernandez (1997) described the effect of 
the board size and composition on the corporate performance. Geletkanycz, Hambrick (1997) 
identified the external ties of senior executives and highlighted the implications for the strategic 
choice and performance. Hallock (1997) characterized the reciprocally interlocking boards of 
directors and executive compensation. Huther (1997) conducted an empirical test of the effect of 
the board size on the firm efficiency. John, Senbet (1997) performed the research on the 
corporate governance and board effectiveness in the firm. Kojima (1997) made an international 
comparison on the corporate governance. Leighton, Thain (1997) discussed the boards of 
directors at the work in the firms. Loderer, Martin (1997) estimated the executive stock 
ownership and performance. Loderer, Peyer (September 5 2001, 2002) discussed the board 
overlap, seat accumulation, and share prices. Maug (1997) considered the alternative forms of 
corporate restructuring with particular interest in the boards of directors and the capital structure. 
Podolny, Baron (1997) described the social networks and mobility in the workplace. Rebers, 
Beetsma, Peters (July 1997) clarified the problem on the role of collusion between the 
management and the board of directors. Rowley (1997) created the network theory of 
stakeholder influences. Rowley (1998) conducted the social network analysis. Elms, Berman, 
Rowley (2000) indentified the network influences on the CEO compensation. Rowley, Behrens, 
Krackhardt (2000) performed an analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel 
and semiconductor industries. Rowley (June 3 2005a, b) characterized the directors networks in 
the board of directors of North American corporations. Rowley, Baum (2008) made the research 
on the dynamics of network position. Tufano, Sevick (1997) described the board structure and 
fee-setting in the US mutual fund industry. Miller (March 26 1997) performed the discussion on 
the Interlocking directorates and the antitrust laws. Uzzi (1997) researched the social structure 
and competition in the inter-firm networks, highlighting the paradox of embeddedness. Vasta, 
Baccini (1997) described the banks and industry in Italy, 1911-36, using the new evidences on 
the interlocking directorates. Adams (1998, 2000) identified the dual role of corporate boards as 
advisors and monitors of management. Adams, Ferreira (2003a) presented a theory of friendly 
board. Adams, Ferreria (2003b) presented the evidences from the corporate boards research on 
the roles of the diversity and incentives. Adams, Mehran (2003) answered the question: Is the 
corporate governance different for the bank holding companies? Adams, Mehran (2004) 
characterized the board structure and banking firm performance. Adams, Mehran (2005, 2008) 
described the corporate performance, board structure and its determinants in the banking 
industry. Adams, Almeida, Ferreira (2005) discussed the roles of powerful CEOs and their 
impact on the corporate performance. Adams, Ferreria (2007) created the theory of friendly 
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boards. Adams, Ferreria (2009) characterized the women in the boardroom and their impact on 
the governance and performance of the firms. Adams, Almeida, Ferreira (2009) tried to 
understand the relationship between the founder–CEOs and the firm performance. Adams, 
Hermalin, Weisbach (2010) explained the role of the boards of directors in the corporate 
governance, creating the conceptual framework and survey. Adams, Funk (2011) discussed the 
gender problems in the boards of directors. Adams, Hermalin, Weisbach (2010) created the 
conceptual framework, conducted the survey, and highlighted the role of the boards of directors 
in the corporate governance. Adams, Gray, Nowland (2012) answered the question: Does gender 
matter in the boardroom?, providing the evidences from the market reaction to the mandatory 
new directors announcements in Australia. Adams, Ragunathan (2012) researched the Lehman 
Brothers firm bankruptcy and its implications on the financial industry in the USA. Aguilera 
(1998) researched the directorships interlocks in the comparative perspective  in the case of 
Spain. Aguilera, Jackson (2003) provided the dimensions and determinants on the cross-national 
diversity of corporate governance. Aguilera, Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) described the codes of good 
governance worldwide. Aguilera (2005a) proposed an institutional comparative perspective on 
the corporate governance and director accountability. Aguilera (2005b) considered the 
corporate governance and labor relations in Spain. Aguilera (2006) completed a comparative 
study of Italy and Spain towards the national state differences and patterns of directorship 
interlocks. Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, Jackson (2008) considered the problems of 
contingencies, complementarities, and costs in the corporate governance models. Aguilera, 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) listed the codes of good governance. Bollobas (1998) created the 
modern graph theory. Bolton, Von Thadden (1998) researched the blocks, liquidity, and 
corporate control. Carretta (1998) researched the role of information systems in the corporate 
governance models. Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006) researched the boards of directors of the 
financial intermediaries, evaluating their competencies, effectiveness and performance. Charan 
(1998) clarified the problem: How can the corporate boards create the competitive advantage 
for their firms. Collin (1998) researched the business groups in Sweden. Conger, Finegold, 
Lawler (1998) accessed the boardroom performance in the firms. Conyon, Peck (1998) 
researched the interconnections between the board size and the corporate performance, taking 
the evidences from the European countries. Conyon, Peck (1998) investigated the complex 
problems on the board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. 
Conyon, Muldoon (2006a) described the small world of corporate boards in Singapore. Conyon, 
Muldoon (2006b) characterized the small world of corporate boards. Conyon, He (2008) 
provided more information on the executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China's 
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listed firms. Denis, Sarin (1998) described the ownership and board structures in the publicly 
traded corporations in France. De Wulf (1998) discussed the corporate governance from the 
Belgian perspective. Eisenberg, Sundgren, Wells (1998) identified that the larger board size 
results in the decreasing firm value in the small firms. Fried, Bruton, Hisrich (1998) researched 
the boards of directors in the venture capital-backed firms. Gispert (1998) investigated the 
board turnover and firm performance in Spanish companies. Goodwin, Seow (August 1998) 
researched the information disclosure, relating to the board members to build the investors' 
confidence. Gulati (1998) described the alliances and networks. Gulati, Singh H (1998) 
discussed the architecture of cooperation, managing the coordination uncertainty and 
interdependence in the strategic alliances. Gulati (1999) researched the influences by the 
network resources and firm capabilities on the alliance formation. Gulati, Garguilo (1999) 
answered the question: Where do networks come from? Gulati, Westphal (1999) uncovered the 
effects of the CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint 
ventures. Haunschild, Beckman (1998) considered the problem: When do interlocks matter? 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, Grossman (2002) investigated the effects of institutional ownership 
heterogeneity and internal governance on the corporate innovation strategies. Hopt, Kanada, 
Roe, Wymeersch, Prigge (editors) (1998) characterized the present state of the art in the 
comparative corporate governance. Hopt (1998) described the German two-tier board, including 
the experiences, theories, reforms. Hopt, Leyens (2004) reviewed the board models in Europe, 
describing the recent developments of the internal corporate governance structures in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Hopt (2006) researched the actual problems of the 
boards of directors. Hung (1998) considered the theories of governing boards. Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, Wells (1998) noted that the larger board size may result in the decreasing firm value 
in the small firms. Everett, Borgatti (1998) performed an analysis of the clique overlap. John, 
Senbet (1998) considered the problems of the corporate governance and board effectiveness. 
Khanna, Gulati, Nohria (1998) measured the dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, 
cooperation, and relative scope. Klein (1998a) made a comparative analysis on the firm 
productivity and the board committee structure. Klein (1998b) characterized the affiliated 
directors in the firms with the particular focus on the directors’ effectiveness. Klein (1998c) 
investigated the firm performance and board committee structure. Klein (2002) researched the 
audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Klein, Shapiro, 
Young (2005) studied the corporate governance, family ownership and firm value, considering 
the Canadian evidences. Kose, Senbet (1998) researched the corporate governance and board 
effectiveness. Mac Canna, Brennan, O’Higgins (1998) characterized the national networks of 
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corporate power from the Irish perspective. Mak, Li (1998) researched the ownership structure, 
investment opportunities and board structure in Singapore. Lim, Mak (1999) investigated the 
ownership structure, board structure and corporate diversification in Singapore. Eng, Mak 
(November 21-24 1999) studied the ownership structure, board structure and corporate 
disclosure in Singapore. Mak, Phan (December 2000) researched the developments in the field of 
the corporate governance in Singapore for the next millennium. Mak, Li (2001) discussed the 
determinants of corporate ownership and board structure with the evidence from Singapore. 
Mak, Kusnadi (2005) provided the further evidences on the negative relationship between the 
board size and the firm value. Muth, Donaldson (1998) presented a contingency approach to the 
stewardship theory and the board structure. Sanders, Carpenter (1998) considered the role of 
the CEO compensation, top management team composition, and board structure in the firm 
governance. Spencer (1998) discussed the Netherlands board index. Stuart (1998) conducted an 
investigation of the strategic alliance formation in the high-technology industry. Vafeas, 
Theodorou (1998) characterized the relationship between the board structure and the firm 
performance in the UK. Vafeas (1999) completed a comparative analysis on the board meeting 
frequency and the firm performance. Vafeas (2000) considered the board structure and the 
informativeness of earnings. Vafeas (2003) researched the length of board tenure and the outside 
director independence. Karamanou, Vafeas (2005) completed an empirical analysis on an 
association between the corporate boards, the audit committees, and the management earnings 
forecasts. Wagner, Stimpert, Fubara (1998) described the board composition and the 
organizational performance, presenting the two studies on the insider/outsider effects. Warther 
(1998) presented a model of the board’s relationship to the management and the shareholders, 
investigating the board effectiveness and board dissent problems. Watts, Strogatz (1998) 
discovered the collective dynamics of small-world networks. Watts (1999a) devoted his research 
time to the investigation on the small worlds in the corporate governance. Watts (1999b) 
characterized the dynamics of networks between order and randomness. Watts (1999c) described 
the networks, dynamics, and the small world phenomenon. Yamori (December 1998) provided 
the characteristics to the bureaucrat-managers in the Japanese financial institutions. Zingales 
(1998) discussed the problems in the corporate governance. Zingales (2000) conducted the 
research in search of new foundations for the corporate governance. Barabasi, Albert (1999) 
highlighted an emergence of scaling in the random networks. Barabasi (2002) emphasized the 
fact that the directors in the firms are linked. Borgatti, Everett (1999) proposed the models of 
core/periphery structures. Borgatti (2002) outlined the basic social network concepts. Borgatti, 
Everett, Freeman (2002) developed the software for social network analysis. Borgatti, Foster 
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(2003) described the network paradigm in the organizational research. Borgatti (2005) 
discussed the centrality and network flow problems. Borgatti (2006) identified the sets of key 
players in a social network. Brunello, Graziano, Parigi (January 26 1999, 2000) explained the 
problem: What determines board of directors' turnover in Italy? Carroll, Malcolm (August 1999) 
characterized the networks of the interlocking directorships in Canada and Australia. Core, 
Holthauser, Larcker (1999) focused their attention on the corporate governance, CEO 
compensation, and firm performance. Davies (1999) suggested a strategic approach to the 
corporate governance. Denis, Sarin (1999) researched the ownership and board structures in the 
publicly traded corporations. Fohlin (1999) described the rise of interlocking directorates in 
imperial Germany. Forbes, Milliken (1999) proposed that the boards of directors represent the 
strategic decision-making groups. Hillman, Zardkoohi, Bierman (1999) assumed that the 
corporate political strategies and the firm performance are interconnected, indicating the firm-
specific benefits from the personal service in the US government. Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold 
(2000) stressed on the resource dependence role of corporate directors, researching the strategic 
adaptation of the board composition. Hillman, Keim, Luce (2001) considered the board 
composition and stakeholder performance, answering the question: Do stakeholder directors 
make a difference? Hillman, Dalziel (2003) integrated the agency theory and the resource 
dependence perspectives on the boards of directors and the firm performance issues. Maassen 
(1999) made an international comparison of corporate governance models. MacAvoy, Millstein 
(1999) characterized the active board of directors and its effects on the performance of the large 
publicly traded corporation. Maman (1999) investigated the interlocking ties within the business 
groups in Israel, 1974-1987. Maman (2001) researched the social capital, the career expansion 
of directors of business groups in Israel. Morck, Nakamura (1999) researched the banks and 
corporate control in Japan. Morck, Nakamura, Shivdasani (October 2000) investigated the 
banks, ownership structure, and firm valuation in Japan. Morck, Wolfenzon, Yeung (2005) wrote 
a research article on the corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Postma, 
van Ees, Garretsen, Sterken (1999) described the top management team, the board 
characteristics and the firm performance in the Netherlands. Renneboog (1999) considered such 
research topics as the ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on 
the Brussels stock exchange. Rindova (1999) answered the question: What corporate boards 
have to do with strategy? Van Manen, Hooghiemstra (1999) characterized the supervisory 
directors in the Netherlands. Westphal (1999) researched the collaboration in the boardroom, 
focusing on the behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Westphal, 
Frederickson (2001) investigated the director experience, the election of new CEOs, and change 
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in corporate strategy. Carpenter, Westphal (2001) studied the strategic context of external 
network ties, examining the impact of director appointments on the board involvement in the 
strategic decision - making. Almazan, Suarez (January 2000) investigated the optimal corporate 
governance structures. Barbi (2000) considered the interlocking directorship networks, focusing 
on the problem: What is relevant for the evolution and change of the networks? Beetsmaa, 
Peters, Rebers (2000) tried to understand a role of collusion between the management and the 
board of directors. Blackhurst (2000) studied the multiple directorships. Braiotta (2000) wrote 
the audit committee handbook. Bryan, Hwang, Klein, Lilien (2000) completed an empirical 
analysis of economic determinants of the compensation of outside directors. Chen, Jaggi (2000) 
discovered the association between independent non-executive directors, family control and 
financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Dyer, Noboeka (2000) discussed the creation and 
management of a high performance knowledge-sharing network in the case of Toyota. Fiegener, 
Brown, Dreux, Dennis (2000) documented the cases of the adoption of outside boards by the 
small private US firms. Fich (2000) answered the question: Do directors who are CEOs of other 
firms enhance firm performance? Gargiulo, Gulati (January 2000) researched the problem: 
Where do inter-organizational networks come from? Gulik, Gedajlovic, Maassen, Bosch, 
Volberda (July 8-11 2000) researched a service role of the boards of directors, based on the 
research work by Pfeffer (1972). Huat Ong, Hoon Lee (2000) tried to find the possible 
interconnections between the board functions and the firm performance. Kracaw, Zenner (2000) 
analyzed a role of bankers in the boardroom. Miwa, Ramseyer (2000) estimated the value of 
prominent directors, studying the lessons in corporate governance from transition Japan. 
O'Sullivan (2000a) was focused on the impact of board composition and ownership on the audit 
quality, bringing the evidences from large UK companies. O`Sullivan (2000b) studied the 
corporate governance and economic performance in the United States and Germany. O'Sullivan, 
Diacon (2002) considered the impacts of ownership, governance, and non-audit services on the 
audit fees, analyzing the evidences from the insurance industry. Rhoades, Rechner, 
Sundaramurthy (2000) studied the board composition and financial performance, including a 
meta analysis of the influence of outside directors. Robert, Evans, Honemann, Balch (October 1 
2000) developed the Robert's rules of order. Samra-Fredericks (2000a) completed the ‘boards-
in-action’ research with the purpose to capture and analyse the directors and senior managers 
interactive routines. Samra-Fredericks (2000b) conducted an analysis of the behavioural 
dynamics of corporate governance in the UK. Scott (2000) focused on the research toward the 
social network analysis. Ward (2000) created the boardroom insider guidebook, aiming to 
improve corporate boards. Whittington, Mayer (2000) considered the European corporations’ 
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strategies and structures. Agnblad, Berglof, Hogfeldt, Svancar (2001) studied the ownership and 
control in Sweden. Crespi, Garcia–Cestona (2001) investigated the ownership and control of the 
Spanish listed firms. Dehaene, De Vuyst, Ooghe (2001) evaluated the corporate performance 
and board structure in Belgian companies. Ferri, Masciandaro, Messori (2001) considered the 
corporate governance, board turnover and performance of banks in Italy. Ferris, Jagannathan 
(2001) studied the incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships. Ferris, 
Jagannathan, Pritchard (2003) researched the directors with the multiple board appointments. 
Golden, Zajac (2001) tried to answer the question: When will boards influence strategy? 
Heracleous (2001) considered the problem: What is the impact of corporate governance on 
organizational performance? Heracleous, Murray (2001) created a theoretical framework for the 
networks, interlocking directors and strategy research. Ingley, Van der Walt (2001) researched a 
changing role of directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Kroszner, 
Strahan (2001a, b) investigated the board connections, conflicts of interest, and lender liability 
in the banks. Lin (2001) created the network theory of social capital. Monks, Minow (2001) 
researched the corporate governance problems. Newman, Strogatz, Watts (2001), Newman 
(2003) researched the structure and function of complex networks. Newman (2007) developed 
the mathematics of networks. Okazaki, Yokoyama (October 2001) measured the extent and 
implications of director interlocking in the pre-war Japanese banking industry. Perry, 
Shivdasani (2001) answered the question: Do boards affect performance?, providing some 
evidences from the corporate restructuring. Postma, van Ees (2001) presented the research on 
the functions of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. Rhoades, Rechner, Sundaramurthy 
(2001) conducted a meta-analysis of the board leadership structure and financial performance, 
answering the question: Are two heads better than one? Schilling (July 2001) investigated the 
corporate governance in Germany, identifying the move to the shareholder value. Snijders 
(2001) completed the statistical evaluation of social network dynamics. Snijders (2003) created 
the models for the longitudinal network data. Stiles, Taylor (2001) considered the boards at 
work: How do directors view their roles and responsibilities? Tomka (2001) researched the 
interlocking directorates between banks and industrial companies in Hungary at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Watts (2001) proposed a dynamic model of network formation. Welch 
(2001a, b), Welch J, Welch S (2006) described the possible practical approaches to the 
boardroom problems solutions findings in the firms. Baena Del Alcazar (2002) conducted the 
research on the nature of power, examining the governing elite and the institutional power in 
Spain, 1939-1992. Bainbridge (2002) discussed the group decision making in the corporate 
governance. Becht, Bolton, Roell (October 2002) studied the corporate governance and control. 
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Bianchi, Bianco, Enriques (2002) described the pyramidal groups and the separation between 
the ownership and the control in Italy. Bianchi, Bianco, Giacomelli, Pacces, Trento (2005) 
considered the ownership and control of firms in Italy. Bianchi, Bianco (2006) studied the Italian 
corporate governance in the last 15 years, emphasizing the transition from the pyramids to the 
coalitions. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, Riley (2002) described the board’s characteristics and 
evaluated the audit fees. Chau, Gray (2002) discussed the business ownership structure and 
corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. Everard, Henry (2002) completed 
a social network analysis of the interlocked directorates in the electronic commerce firms. 
Faccio, Lang (2002) studied the ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Hanna, 
Walsh (2002) researched the small firm networks as a successful approach to innovation. 
Lindgren (2002) investigated the succession strategies in a large family business group, 
considering the case of the Swedish Wallenberg family. Morris, Hyun Song Shin (2002) 
estimated the social value of public information. Perry, Peyer (September 2002, August 12 2005) 
studied the board seat accumulation by the executives, accenting their conclusions on the 
shareholder’s perspective. Sonnenfeld (2002) researched the problem: What makes the great 
boards great? Volpin (2002) worked on the problem of the corporate governance with the poor 
investor protection, taking the evidences from the top executive turnover. Bainbridge (November 
2003) described the pre-commitment strategies in corporate law. Borgatti, Foster (2003) 
discussed the network paradigm in the organizational research. Burgess, Fallon (2003) 
conducted a longitudinal study of women directors in Australia. Carter, Simkins, Simpson (2003) 
studied the corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, 
Simpson (2010) considered the gender and ethnic diversity of the US boards and board 
committees and the firm financial performance. Dann, Del Guercio, Partch (2003) documented 
the governance and boards of directors in the closed-end investment companies. De (2003) 
researched the incidence, performance effects of interlocking directorates in the emerging 
market business groups, considering the evidences from India. Fich, White (2003) studied the 
effects of mutually interlocked boards on the CEO compensation and turnover. Fich, White 
(2005) explained the problem: Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other’s boards? Fich, 
Shivdasani (2006) researched the problem: Are busy boards effective monitors? Gabrielsson 
(2003) conducted an inquiry into the boards’ contribution to the firm performance. Gillette, Noe, 
Rebello (2003) researched the corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior 
experimental evidence. Gillette, Noe, Rebello (2008) completed an empirical investigation on the 
board structures around the world. Graziano, Luporini (2003) discussed the board efficiency 
and the internal corporate control mechanisms. Graziano, Luporini (September 2005) studied 
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the ownership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure. Higgs (2003) reviewed 
the role and effectiveness of nonexecutive directors. Humphry Hung (July 2003) proposed a dual 
network model of interlocking directorates. Ibrahim, Howar, Angelis (2003) described the board 
members in the service industry, making an empirical examination of the relationship between 
the corporate social responsibility orientation and the directorial type. Kiel, Nicholson (2003) 
considered the issues of the board composition and the corporate performance, solving the 
problem: How does the Australian experience complement the contrasting theories of corporate 
governance. Kiel, Nicholson (2006) collected the information on the multiple directorships, 
corporate performance in Australian listed companies. Levy, Loebbecke, Powell (2003) 
characterized the role of information systems SMEs, cooptation and knowledge sharing. Lin, 
Pope, Young (2003) documented the stock market reactions to the appointment of outside 
directors. Malcolm (2003) described the boardroom networks among Australian company 
directors, 1976 and 1996, identifying the impact of investor capitalism. Mínguez, Martín (2003) 
researched the board of directors a a mechanism of control in the firm. Omar (2003) investigated 
the boards of directors and financial performance of the Malaysian block-holding companies. 
Ong, Wan, Ong (October 2003) conducted an exploratory study on the interlocking directorates 
in the listed firms in Singapore. Ornstein (2003) completed research on the Canadian corporate 
network in the comparative perspective. Phan, Lee, Lau (2003) characterized the performance 
impact of interlocking directorates in the case of Singapore. Postma, Van Ees, Sterken (2003) 
described the board composition and firm performance in the Netherlands. Rodriguez, 
Cardenas, Oltra (2003) presented a study on the networks of economic power in Europe. 
Ruhwedel, Epstein (2003) completed a research on an empirical analysis of structures and 
processes in the boards of directors in the German firms. Schmidt (2003) investigated the 
corporate governance in Germany from an economic perspective. Singh, Davidson (2003) 
studied the agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Tihanyi, 
Johnson, Hoskisson, Hitt (2003) researched the institutional ownership differences and the 
international diversification, focusing on the effects of the boards of directors and identifying the 
technological opportunity. Tosi, Shen, Gentry (2003) answered the question: Why the outsiders 
on the boards can’t solve the corporate governance problem? Van der Walt, Ingley (2003) 
described the board dynamics and the influence of professional background, gender and ethnic 
diversity of directors. Williams (2003) discussed the presence of the women on the corporate 
boards of directors and their influence on the corporate philanthropy. Xie, Davidson, DaDalt 
(2003), discussing the earnings management and corporate governance, identified clearly the 
role of the board and the audit committee. Yeo, Pochet, Alcouffe (2003) described the CEO 
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reciprocal interlocks in French corporations. Anderson, Reeb (2004) researched the board 
composition in S&P 500 firms. Anderson, Mansi, Reeb (2004) studied the board characteristics, 
accounting report integrity and the cost of debt. Anderson, Sawyer (2014) characterized the 
board of directors as an agent of change in the turnarounds. Battiston, Catanzaro (2004) 
considered the statistical properties of both the corporate board and the director networks. 
Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell (2004) clarified the problem: What matters in the corporate 
governance? Bebchuk, Cohen (2005) calculated the cost of entrenched boards. Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, Peyer (2006a, b) characterized the lucky CEOs, directors in the firms. Bebchuk, 
Cremers, Peyer (2007) studied the CEO centrality. Bebchuk, Weisbach (2010) defined the state 
of corporate governance research. Beekes, Pope, Young (2004) indentified the link between the 
earnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board composition, taking the evidences from 
the UK. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, Zimmermann (2004) answered the question: Is the board size 
independent from the corporate governance mechanism? Böcking, Dutzi, Müßig (2004) 
discussed the economic function of the board of directors in the firm. Brunninge, Nordqvist 
(2004) researched the ownership structure, board composition and entrepreneurship on the base 
of the evidences from the family firms and venture-capital-backed firms. Caldarelli, Catanzaro 
(2004) studied the corporate boards networks. Corbetta, Salvato (2004) discussed the board of 
directors composition in the family firms? Drobetz, Schillhofer, Zimmermann (2004) described 
the corporate governance and the expected stock returns, using the evidences from Germany. 
Dulewicz, Herbert (2004) researched the problem: Does the composition and practice of the 
boards and directors bear any relationship to the performance of their companies? Gabrielsson, 
Huse (2004) spent some time thinking on the context, behavior, and evolution of the boards of 
directors and the corporate governance. Gul, Leung (2004) researched the board leadership, 
outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures. Hakansson, Lind (2004) 
focused on the accounting and network coordination in the firms. Heinze (2004) characterized 
the dynamics in the German system of corporate governance, presenting the empirical findings 
on the interlocking directorates. Levine (April 2004) focused on the study of the concise 
discussion of concepts and issues during the corporate governance of banks. Maitlis (2004) 
discussed the problem: How CEOs influence (and fail to influence) their boards? Nicholson, 
Kiel (2004) created a framework for the diagnosing of the board effectiveness. OECD (2004) 
developed the principles of corporate governance. O’Hagan, Green (2004) used a network 
analysis approach to measure the corporate knowledge transfer via the interlocking 
directorates. Peasnell, Pope, Young (2004, 2005) studied the board monitoring and earnings 
management, finding an answer to the question: Do the outside directors influence abnormal 
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accruals? Peng (2004) evaluated the outside directors and firm performance during institutional 
transitions. Randøy, Jenssen J I (2004) studied the board independence and the product market 
competition in Swedish firms. Rinaldi (June 25-26 2004) researched the business elites in Italy: 
1913-1972. Rinaldi, Vasta (2005) researched the structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972, 
using the interlocking directorates technique. Rinaldi, Vasta (2008) studied the Italian corporate 
network, 1952- 1983, applying the interlocking directorates technique. Robins, Alexander (2004) 
considered the small worlds among the interlocking directors with particular attention to the 
network structure and distance in bipartite graphs. Rodriguez, Cardenas, Oltra (2004) 
researched the networks of economic power in Europe. Ryan, Wiggins (2004) studied the 
director’s compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Shamsul 
(2004) researched the board composition, CEO duality and performance among the  Malaysian 
listed companies. Stablein, Cleland, Mackie, Reid (2004) investigated the New Zealand exchange 
limited boards and directors, concluding that it is a small world after all. Van Den Berghe, 
Levrau (2004) evaluated the boards of directors, answering the question: What constitutes a 
good corporate board? Webb (2004) conducted an examination of the socially responsible firms' 
board structure. Uzun, Szewczyk, Varma (2004) researched the board composition and corporate 
fraud problems. Ajinkya, Bhojraj, Sengupta (2005) established an association between the 
outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. 
Andrés, Azofra, López (2005) wrote on the corporate boards in some OECD countries, 
researching such parameters as the size composition, functioning and effectiveness. Andrés, 
Vallelado (2008) studied the corporate governance in banking, concentrating on the role of 
board of directors. Attig, Morck (2005) documented the boards, corporate governance in a 
typical country. Bohren, Strom (2005) characterized the value creating board in the firm. Burris 
(2005) discussed the interlocking directorates and political cohesion among the corporate elites. 
Carrington, Scott, Wasserman (2005) studied the models and methods in social network 
analysis. Chabi, Maati (2005) researched the small World of the CAC 40 index. Charan (2005) 
researched the boards that deliver, writing on the advancement of the corporate governance 
from the compliance to the competitive advantage. Cheng, Firth (2005) researched the 
ownership, corporate governance and top management pay in Hong Kong. Cools (2005) 
explained the real difference in the corporate law between the United States and the continental 
Europe, showing the real distribution of powers. Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2005) researched the 
boards, answering the question: Does one size fit all? Corley (2005) examined the non-executive 
director's role from a non-agency theory perspective, highlighting the implications arising from 
the Higgs report. De Nooy, Mrvar, Batagelj (2005) completed an exploratory social network 
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analysis with the Pajek software program. Deutsch (2005) demonstrated an impact of the board 
composition on the firms' critical decisions in his meta - analytic review. Erickson, Park, 
Reising, Shin (2005) investigated the board composition and the firm value under the 
concentrated ownership, providing the Canadian evidences. Farell, Hersch (2005) researched 
the corporate boards, highlighting the effect of gender. Feng, Ghosh, Sirmans (2005) answered 
the question: How important is the board of directors to REIT performance? Fich, White (2005) 
considered the problem: Why does CEOs reciprocally seat on each other’s board. Francois-
Philippe Boisserolles (2005) researched the human resources management problems. Galo 
(2005) considered the independent board directors, thinking about the problem:  How to 
improve their contribution to the family business. Hanneman, Riddle (2005) made an 
introduction to the social network methods. Harris, Raviv (2005, 2008) created a theory of board 
control and size. Hayes, Mehran, Schaefer (2005) researched the board committee structures, 
ownership, and firm performance. Hendrikse (July 2005) characterized the boards in the 
agricultural cooperatives, focusing on the competence, authority, and incentives. Hendrikse 
(2006) discussed the two vignettes, regarding the boards in the cooperatives versus the 
corporations, studying the cooperative hierarchies. Hogfeldt (2005) described the history and 
politics of co-ownership in Sweden, researching the history of corporate governance around the 
world. Kyereboah-Coleman, Biekpe (2005) considered the relationship between the board size, 
board composition CEO duality and the firm performance, using the experiences from Ghana. 
Linn, Park (2005) described the outside director compensation policy and the investment 
opportunity set. Page, Wooders, Kamat (2005) researched the networks and farsighted stability. 
Peasnell, Pope, Young (2005) researched the board monitoring and earnings management, 
answering the question: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Pueyo (2005) 
investigated the inter-firm relationships and the interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in 
the twentieth century. Pueyo (2006) studied the interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in 
the twentieth century. Raheja (2005) described the determinants of the board size and the 
composition in frames of his theory on the corporate boards. Roberts, McNulty, Stiles (2005) 
decided to make the research beyond the agency conceptions of the work of the nonexecutive 
director, thinking on the problem of the accountability creation in the boardroom. Saleh, 
Iskandar, Rahmat (2005) discussed the earnings management and the board characteristics, 
bringing the evidences from Malaysia. Schnake, Fredenberger, Williams (2005) uncovered the 
influence of the board characteristics on the frequency of 10-K investigations of firms in the 
financial services sector. Schnake, Williams (2008) researched the multiple directorships and 
corporate misconduct, discussing the moderating influences on the board size and outside 
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directors. Wan, Ong (2005) studied the board structure, process and performance, providing the 
evidences from the public-listed companies in Singapore. Ahmed, Hossain, Adams (2006) 
considered the effects of board composition and board size on the informativeness of annual 
accounting earnings. Barucci (2006) researched the problems on the corporate governance in 
Italy. Bassen, Kleinschmidt, Zollner (Spring 2006) researched the corporate governance of 
German growth companies, conducting an empirical analysis of the corporate governance 
quality and the structure of supervisory boards of companies listed on TEC-DAX. Batagelj, 
Mrvar (2006) created the Pajek software program for the social networks analysis. Bertoni, 
Randone (2006) described the small-world of Italian finance, considering the ownership 
interconnections and the board interlocks amongst the Italian listed companies. Bizjak, Lemmon, 
Whitby (2006, 2009) researched the option backdating and board interlocks. Boone, Field, 
Karpoff, Raheja (2006) conducted an empirical analysis on the determinants of corporate board 
size and independence. Brick, Palmon, Wald (2006) investigated the CEO compensation, 
director compensation and firm performance, finding some evidences of cronyism. Carbonai, Di 
Bartolomeo (November 2006, August 2007) studied the interlocking directorates as a thrust 
substitute, considering the case of the Italian non-life insurance industry. Carretta, Farina, 
Schwizer (2006) evaluated the board of directors of financial intermediaries, focusing on the 
competencies, effectiveness and performance. Farina (2008) considered the banks' centrality in 
the corporate interlock networks, taking the evidences in Italy. Cheng, Courtenay (2006) 
described the board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. Chhaochharia, 
Grinstein (2006a, 2007) considered the corporate governance and the firm value, stressing on 
the impact of the 2002 governance rules. Chhaochharia, Grinstein (2006b) researched the 
executive compensation and the board structure. Chhaochharia, Grinstein (2009) studied the 
CEO compensation and the board structure. Corrado, Zollo (2006) described the small worlds 
evolution: Governance reforms, privatizations, and ownership networks in Italy. Elouaer (2006) 
documented his thoughts on the boardroom networks among the French companies in 1996 - 
2005. Fauver, Fuerst (2006) answered the question: Does good corporate governance include 
the employee representation?, considering the evidences from the German corporate boards. 
Ferrarini (2006) discussed the one share - one vote problem as a European rule? Gillan, 
Hartzell, Starks (2006) described the tradeoffs in the corporate governance, describing the 
evidences from the board structures and the charter provisions. Goyer (2006a) focused his 
research on the varieties of institutional investors and the national models of capitalism, 
describing the transformation of corporate governance in France and Germany. Goyer (2006b) 
wrote on the transformation of corporate governance in France, describing the changing 
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France. Guieu, Meschi (2006) researched the boards of directors structures and operational 
dynamics in France in 2000-2003. Haniffa, Hudaib (2006) the corporate governance structure 
and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Hsu-Huei Huang, Paochung Hsu, Khan H A, 
Yun-Lin Yu May (2006) answered the question: Does the appointment of the outside director 
increase firm value?, taking the evidences from Taiwan. Jackson (2006) considered the 
economics of social networks in the frames of the econometrics theory. Kakabadse A P, 
Kakabadse N K, Barrat (2006) conducted the research on the CSR in the boardroom, describing 
the contribution of non executive director. Kamran, Mahmud, Mike (2006) described the effects 
of board composition and board size on the informativeness of annual accounting earnings. 
Kramarz, Thesmar (January 2006) described the social networks in the boardroom. Krivogorsky 
(2006) discussed the ownership, board structure, and performance in continental Europe. 
Kyereboah, Biekpe (2006) answered the question: Do boards and CEO’s matter for bank 
performance?, making a comparative analysis of banks in Ghana. Limpaphayom, Connelly 
(2006) provided the board characteristics and firm performance, using the multiple evidences 
from the life insurance industry in Thailand. Linck, Netter, Yang (2006) conducted a large 
sample study on the board changes and determinants of the board structure. Linck, Netter, Yang 
(2007) discussed the determinants of board structure. MacLean, Harvery, Press (2006) 
characterized the business elites and corporate governance in France and the UK. Morresi 
(2006) the directors changes in the boards of directors in the firms, making the research on the 
business administration in Italy. Murgia (2006) researched the interlocking directors in the IT 
firms, based on the social network analysis approach. Osterloh, Frey (2006) came to the 
conclusion that the shareholders should welcome knowledge workers as the directors. Prinz 
(2006) researched the corporate governance and the uncertain role of interlocking directorates. 
Pueyo (2006) considered the interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth 
century. Ravasi, Zattoni (2006) explored the political side of the board involvement in the 
strategy, conducting a study on the mixed-ownership institutions. Ruigrok, Peck, Keller (2006) 
described the board characteristics and involvement in the strategic decision making, using the 
evidences from Swiss companies. Saito, Dutra (2006) characterized the boards of directors of 
publicly-held companies in Brazil, focusing on the profile and implications for minority 
shareholders. Silva, Majluf, Paredes (2006) researched the family ties, interlocking directorates, 
performance of business groups in the emerging countries, studying the case of Chile. Soon 
Moon Kang (May 23 2006) considered the equi-centrality and network centralization, finding the 
micro-macro linkage. Yano (2006) wrote on the optimal board system: Supervisory board vs. 
management board. Ahmed, Duellman (2007) described the accounting conservatism and the 
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board of directors’ characteristics in an empirical research analysis. Ali (2007) investigated the 
disclosure quality and corporate governance, taking the evidences from the French stock market. 
Bjuggren, Eklund, Wiberg (2007) researched the ownership structure, control and firm 
performance, concentrating on the effects of vote differentiated shares. Eklund, Palmberg, 
Wiberg (2009) described the ownership structure, board composition and investment 
performance. Boone, Field, Karpoff, Raheja (2007) highlighted the determinants of corporate 
board size and composition in an empirical research analysis. Bozec, Dia (2007) researched the 
board structure and the firm technical efficiency, bringing the evidences from the Canadian state 
owned enterprises. Campbell, Minguez-Vera (2007) studied the gender diversity in the 
boardroom and the firm financial performance. Carver (November 2007) wrote on the promise 
of governance theory: Beyond codes and best practices. Choi, Park, Yoo (2007) estimated the 
value of outside directors, applying the evidences from the corporate governance reform from 
Korea. Ciocca (2007) made the research on the rich business elite in Italy (1796-2005). Clarke 
(2007) proposed the three concepts of the independent director. Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, 
Donahue (2007) described the moderating effect of the CEO power on the board composition, 
researching the firm performance relationship. Dahya, McConnell (2007) investigated the board 
composition, corporate performance, and the Cadbury Committee recommendation. Dahya, 
Dimitrov, McConnell (2008) researched the dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and 
corporate value in a cross-country analysis. Dahya, Dimitrov, McConnell (2009) considered the 
problem: Does the board independence matter in the companies with a controlling shareholder? 
Enriques, Volpin (Winter 2007) studied the corporate governance reforms in the continental 
Europe. Fernandes (2007, 2008) researched the role of “independent” board members, board 
compensation and firm performance. Finegold, Benson, Hecht (2007) studied the corporate 
boards and company performance, making a review of research findings in the light of recent 
reforms. Garcia Osma, Gill de Albornoz Noguer (2007) described the effect of the board 
composition and its monitoring committees on earnings management, taking the evidences from 
Spain. Gerber (2007) researched the interlock benefits and the anticompetitive harm toward an 
optimal definition of the competitors under the section 8 of the Clayton Act. Gordon (2007) 
described the rise of independent directors in the United States, 1950-2005. Heimbrandt (2007) 
investigated the business administration problems. Hsu (2007) considered the boards of 
directors and the audit committees in the initial public offerings. Huafang, Jianguo (2007) 
researched the ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure, 
using the evidences from the listed companies in China. Ibarra (2007) conducted the research on 
the networking opportunities: What you know or who you know? Kelly, Gennard (2007) 
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considered the business strategic decision making with a particular interest in the role and 
influence of directors. Kim, Nofsinger (2007) researched the corporate governance. Lara, Osma, 
Penalva (2007) investigated the board of directors' characteristics and conditional accounting 
conservatism, using the Spanish evidence. Ledenyov V O (2007a) discussed the problem: Can 
social networking boost businesses? Ledenyov V O (2007b) participated in the discussion on the 
thinking like a leader. Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2007) researched the governance indices and 
causation: Which causes which? Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2009) described the determinants of the size 
and structure of the US corporate boards, 1935-2000. Lim, Matolcsy, Chow (2007) considered 
the association between the board composition and the different types of voluntary disclosure. 
Malloy (2007) researched the social networks. Mourkogiannis (2007) formulated the true 
purpose of the board. Murray (2007) described the new rules of power in the boardroom in the 
corporate America. Non, Franses (2007) researched the possible interconnection between the 
interlocking boards and the firm performance, taking the evidences from a new panel database. 
Patelli, Prencipe (2007) investigated the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the 
independent directors in the presence of a dominant shareholder. Provan, Fish, Sydow (2007) 
characterized the interorganizational networks at the network level in a review on the empirical 
literature on the whole networks. Pugliese, Wenstop (2007) described the board members' 
contribution to the strategic decision - making in the small firms. Rommens, Cuyvers, Deloof 
(November 2007) characterized the interlocking directorates and the business groups, using the 
Belgian evidence. Deloof, Vermoesen (December 2011) estimated the value of bank 
relationships, taking the evidences from Belgium at the start of the Great Depression. Rose 
(2007) answered the question: Does female board representation influence firm performance?, 
using the Danish evidence. Rutherford, Buchholtz (2007) investigated the relationship between 
the board characteristics and the board information. Santella, Drago, Paone (2007) stated on the 
issue: Who cares about director independence? Santella, Drago, Polo (November 11 2007) 
conducted an empirical analysis of the Italian listed company boards from 1998 to 2006. 
Santella, Drago, Polo, Gagliardi (2009) made a comparison among the director networks in the 
main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Schmid, Zimmerman 
(2007) answered the question: Should chairman and CEO be separated?, researching the 
leadership structure and firm performance in Switzerland. Singh V (2007) investigated the ethnic 
diversity on the top corporate boards from a resource dependency perspective. Uzzi, Amaral, 
Reed-Tsochas (2007) characterized the small-world networks in the management science 
research in a comprehensive review. Visser, Swank (2007) wrote on the committees of experts in 
the firms. Voordeckers, Van Gils, Van Den Heuvel (2007) characterized the board composition 
31 
 
in the small and medium-sized family firms. Andres (2008) analyzed the large shareholders and 
the firm performance in an empirical examination on the founding-family ownership. Bammens, 
Voordeckers, Van Gils (2008) described the boards of directors in the family firms from a 
generational perspective. Baranchuck, Dybvig (2008) researched the consensus reaching 
problem in the diverse corporate boards. Bowen (2008) created an insider's guide for the 
directors and trustees in the form of the board book. Canarella, Nouray (2008) characterized the 
executive compensation and the firm performance, covering the problems on the adjustment 
dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry. Chan, Li (2008) wrote on the audit committee and firm 
value, providing the evidences on the outside top executives as the expert independent directors. 
Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2008a, b) studied the problem of boards, answering the question: Does 
one size fit all? Farrell, Friesen, Hersch (2008) explained the problem: How do firms adjust 
director compensation? Fluck, Khanna (2008) created the theory of corporate boards with the 
endogenous information collection, optimal compensation and strategic voting, answering the 
problem: When do independent boards dominate rubberstamping ones? Gelter (2008) showed 
the dark side of shareholder influence toward a holdup theory of stakeholders in the comparative 
corporate governance. Harford, Li, Zhao (2008) researched the corporate boards and the 
leverage and debt maturity choices. Ilona (2008) studied the board quality and firm 
performance. Kaymak, Bektas (2008) described the board characteristics in an emerging market, 
using the evidences from Turkish banks. Kumar, Sivaramakrishnan (2008) described the effect of 
board independence on the executive compensation and firm value. Lam, Lee (2008) conducted 
an analysis on the CEO duality and the firm performance, applying the evidences from Hong 
Kong. Lapido, Nestor, Risser (2008) characterized the board profile, structure and practice in 
large European banks. Lefort, Urzua (2008) discussed the board independence, firm 
performance and ownership concentration, using the evidences from Chile. Masulis, Mobbs 
(2008) answered the question: Are all the inside directors the same?, deciding on the CEO 
entrenchment or the board enhancement. Masulis, Mobbs (2010) explained the problem: Are all 
the inside directors the same? Do they entrench CEOs or facilitate more informed board 
decisions? Milakovíc, Alfarano, Lux (2008) researched the small core of the German corporate 
board network. Milakovíc, Raddant, Birg (2009) highlighted the persistence of a network core in 
the time evolution of interlocking directorates. Alfarano, Milakovíc (2009) described the network 
structure and N-dependence in the agent-based herding models. Donnelly, Mulcahy (2008) 
researched the board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. Ong, Wan 
(2008) outlined the three conceptual models of the board role performance. Sarkar, Sarkar, Sen 
(2008) investigated the board of directors and opportunistic earnings management, considering 
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the multiple evidences from India. Schmid, Zimmermann (2008) studied the leadership structure 
and firm performance in Switzerland. Rouby (June 2008) focused his research on the 
composition of the board of directors. Vermeulen (2008) researched the successful business 
strategies by the companies. Tutelman (2008) the various influences from the side of the business 
owners on the boards. Volpe, Woodlock (2008) conducted a survey of board financial literacy. 
Abidin, Kamal, Jusoff (2009) identified the typical board structure and corporate performance 
in Malaysia. Adam, Shavit (2009) highlighted the roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors revisited in the reconciling conflicting stakeholders interests while maintaining 
corporate responsibility. Adams, Gupta, Leeth (2009) tried to clarify a question: Are female 
executives over-represented in precarious leadership positions? Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, 
Yao (2009), Akhtaruddin, Haron (2010) studies the corporate governance, board ownership, 
audit committees' effectiveness and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of 
Malaysian listed firms. Alvarez, Marin, Fonfria (2009) considered a role of networking in the 
competitiveness of firms. Andreas, Rapp, Wolff (2009) defined the determinants of director 
compensation in the two-tier systems, taking the evidences from German. Belkhir (2009) 
measured the board of directors’ size and performance in the banking industry. Cai, Garner, 
Walkling (2009) researched the directors elections. Cai, Garner, Walkling (2010) performed a 
survey, examining the shareholder access to the boardroom. Calabro, Di Carlo, Ranalli (2009) 
spent some time toward the understanding of the conflicts inside the board of directors. 
Chauhan, Dey (2009) studied the board composition and performance in Indian firms. David, 
Ginalski, Mach, Rebmann (2009) researched the Swiss business associations activities as an 
intermediary between the business, politics and administration during the 20th century. Delis, 
Gaganis, Pasiouras (November 2009) investigated the boards of directors in the selected banks. 
Desender (2009) identified a relationship between the ownership structure and the role of the 
board. Desender, García-Cestona, Crespi, Aguilera (November 23 2009) studied the board 
characteristics and the audit fees levels. Dey, Engel, Xiaohui Liu (2009) conducted a polemics 
about the possible advantages of splitting the CEO and board chair roles. Fahlenbrach (2009) 
considered the shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation. Fennema, Heemskerk (2009) 
has been interested in the research on the network dynamics of the Dutch business elite. Francis, 
Hasan, Koetter, Wu (2009) studied the problem: Do corporate board impact financial 
contracting? Ghita, Cuyvers, Deloof (2009) researched the business elites, political connections, 
and economic entrenchment, considering the numerous evidences from Belgium in time period: 
1858–1909. Ghita, Cuyvers, Deloof (2010) documented the rise and decline of the Belgian 
business network in the twentieth century. Gomez (2009) studied some aspects of the business 
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administration. Gomez, Moore (2009) redefined the boundaries of the consulting and corporate 
governance, considering the board members and management consultants’ interaction. 
Gstraunthaler, Lukacs, Steller (2009) studied the board of directors and its role in the corporate 
governance system. Gulamhussen, Guerreiro (2009) determined the influence of the foreign 
equity and board membership on the corporate strategy and internal cost management in 
Portuguese banks. Gulamhussen, Fonte Santa (2009) analyzed the work by the women in the 
bank boardrooms and their influence on the performance and risk-taking. Hasnah (2009) 
determined the multiple impacts of the corporate governance and board performance on the 
performance of public listed companies in Malaysia. Heidrick & Struggles (2009, 2011) studied 
the challenging board performance in the turbulent time. Karoui (2009) conducted the board of 
directors functional performance analysis. Karpov (2009, 2012) proposed the theorem about the 
impossibility of proportional representation and developed a model of corporate board of 
directors elections. Minichilli, Zattoni, Zona (2009) conducted an empirical examination of 
board task performance aiming to making the boards effective. Mnif (2009) researched the board 
of directors and the pricing of initial public offerings in France, trying to get an answer on the 
following question: Does the existence of a properly structured board matter? Pathan (2009) 
considered the research problems such as the strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. 
Pathan, Skully (2010) studied the endogenously structured boards of directors in the banks. 
Rosch (2009) investigated the vertical and conglomerate merger and interlocking directorate 
law enforcement in the United States. Sarkar J, Sarkar S (2009) researched the multiple board 
appointments and firm performance in emerging economies, using the evidences from India. 
Schiehll, Bellavance (2009) considered the boards of directors, CEO ownership, and the use of 
non-financial performance measures in the CEO bonus plan. Schonlau, Singh P V (2009) 
worked on the board networks and merger performance investigation. Schwizer, Farina, 
Stefanelli (November 2009) determined the dimension, structure and skill mix in European 
boards. Stefanelli, Matteo (March 2011) completed an empirical analysis on the board 
monitoring role and the loan portfolio quality measurement in the banks. Setia-Atmaja, 
Tanewski, Skully (2009) tried to understand a role of dividends, debt and board structure in the 
governance of family controlled firms. Stevenson, Radin (2009) studied the social capital and the 
social influence on the board of directors. Strom (2009) attempted to learn more on the modern 
firm performance, corporate governance and investment. Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, Ryan (2010) 
uncovered the information acquisition and monitoring problems by the directors in the board of 
directors, depending on the directors’ locations. Al-Shammari, Al-Sultan (2010) investigated the 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. Baccini, Barabesi (2010) researched 
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the interlocking between economic journals. Baccini, Marroni (September 2013) studied the 
interlocking directorates regulation. Badia-Miro, Blasco, Lozano, Soler (2010) tried to 
understand the centrality and investment strategies at the beginning of industrialization in mid-
nineteen-century. Balta, Woods, Dickson (2010) considered an influence of the boards of 
directors’ characteristics on the strategic decision-making, taking the evidences from the Greek 
companies. Campbell, Minguez-Vera (2010) analyzed the female board appointments and the 
firm valuation from the short and long-term perspectives. Chau, Gray (2010) researched the 
family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure, finding the evidences from 
Hong Kong. Chemmanur, Fedaseyeu (2010) proposed the theory of corporate boards. Cheung, 
Jiang, Tan (2010) studied the Chinese listed companies. Chiang, He (2010) researched the board 
supervision capability and the information transparency problems. Colpan, Hikino, Lincoln 
(2010) compiled the information on the business groups. Dimitropoulos, Asteriou (2010) 
discussed the effect of board composition on the informativeness and quality of annual earnings, 
using the data from Greece. Duchin, Matsusaka, Ozbas (2010) examined the criteria of 
directors’ effectiveness. The former CEO directors have been characterized in Fahlenbrach, 
Minton, Pan (August 2010). Faleye, Hoitash R, Hoitash U (2010) computed the costs of intense 
board monitoring. Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2010) analyzed the dual-class firms in the United 
States. Levy, Pliskin, Ravid (2010) studied the decision making processes via a knowledge 
management lens. Malenko (February 2011) researched the communication and the decision-
making problems in the corporate boards. Mayers, Smith (2010) considered the directors’ 
compensation and the board structure. Palmberg (April 2010) studied the corporate governance 
in the Swedish banking sector. The board interlocks problem has been researched in Stuart, Yim 
(2010). Sulong, Mat Nor (2010) considered the corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
valuation in Malaysian listed firms. Trabelsi (November 2010) researched the governance and 
performance of Tunisian banks. Tran Ngoc Huy Dinh (December 24 2010) compiled a set of the 
limited Asian Pacific corporate governance standards after financial crisis, corporate scandals 
and manipulation. Zhang (2010) performed a study on the board capital and absorptive 
capacity. Allegrini (2011) performed a study on the corporate boards, audit committees and 
voluntary disclosure in Italy. Balduzzi, Graziano, Luporini (January 2011) considered the voting 
issues in the corporate boards with the heterogeneous preferences. Bammens, Voodeckers, Van 
Gils (2011) conducted a research on the boards of directors in the family businesses. Belot, 
Ginglinger, Slovin, Sushka (2011) the unitary and dual boards in France. Bourjade, Germain 
(2011) investigated the possible collusions in the board of directors. Cabrera Suarez, Deniz 
Deniz, Martin Santana (September-December 2011) considered the board of directors and social 
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responsibility potential of non-listed Spanish family firms. Cowen (2011) researched the board’s 
decisions to dismiss the reputationnally compromised directors. Dey, Engel, Xiaohui Liu (2011) 
distinguished the CEO and board chair roles. Dobbin, Jung (2011) considered the corporate 
board gender diversity and stock performance. Donzé (2011) studied the interlocking directors 
in the Swiss watch industry, using a business history of the Swatch Group (1983-2010). Faleye, 
Hoitash, Hoitash (2011) calculated the costs of the intense board monitoring Journal. 
Gabrielsen, Hjelmeng, Sorgard (2011) researched the interlocking directorships. Ghaya 
(October 2011) investigated the board of directors’ involvement in strategic decision making 
process. Lara, Osma, Penalva (2011) studied the board of directors’ characteristics and 
conditional accounting conservatism in Spain. Lorca, Sanchez-Ballesta, Garcia-Meca (2011) 
expressed their thoughts on the board effectiveness and cost of debt. Rousseau, Stroup (2011) 
researched the directors’ histories and the patterns of acquisitions. Stefanescu (2011) studied the 
corporate governance “actors” influence on the banks’ value. Yunos, Smith, Ismail, Ahmad 
(2011) researched the boards of directors and accounting conservatism. Belot, Ginglinger, 
Slovin, Sushka (2012) considered the corporate governance problems with a particular interest 
in the choice between the unitary boards and the dual boards of directors. Bianco, Ciavarella, 
Signoretti (April – June 2012) described the involvement by the women on the boards in Italy. 
Bouaziz, Triki (2012) characterized an impact by the board of directors on the financial 
performance of Tunisian companies. Chu J S G (2012) investigated the corporate interlock 
networks. Fields, Fraser, Subrahmanyam (2012) elaborated on the board quality problems. 
Ghezzi (2012) researched the directors in Italia. Gonzalez Diaz (2012) studied the interlocking 
directorships in the European Union. The board of directors characteristics influences on the 
firm´s performance have been researched in Horváth, Spirollari (2012). Palmberg (2012) 
unveiled the performance effect of corporate board of directors. Pawlak (2012) presented the 
interlocking-directorates monitoring system description. The decline of the American corporate 
network 1960-2010 has been described in Schifeling, Mizruchi (August 27 - 28 2012). Rubio-
Mondejar, Garrues-Irurzun (2012) worked on the corporate structure and interlocking 
directorates in Spanish firms, 1917-1970. Uddin (2012) studied the inter-firm cooperation and 
information sharing through the interlocking directorates. The compensation structure of 
directors in the boards of directors has been described in Merino, Manzaneque, Priego (2013). 
Prete, Stefani (June 2013) researched a role by the women on the Italian bank boards. The 
possible influences by the board of directors on the corporate governance disclosure have been 
discussed in Stefanescu (March 2013). The boards of directors composition and financing 
choices have been uncovered in Alves, Couto, Francisco (2014). Whitehead (December 22, 23 
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2014) discussed the boards of directors overlap in publicly traded and non-traded firms in the 
USA. Ferreira (January 15 2015) presented some facts on the corporate boards. Blood, 
Wisniewska (January 22 2015) characterized the tribes of Davos, using the social networks 
approach. Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (January 22 2015) researched the winning virtuous 
strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the 
firms in the information century. 
Let us move forward with the author’s original proposals consideration on the 
information theory of the firm, making the innovative modeling of the firm, director, board of 
directors, and researching the business strategy creation problem in details. 
 
Modeling of firm as operating system to control, manage and process 
information resources in information theory of firm 
 
Let us begin the research by formulating the purpose of the firm as in Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov VO (2013b): “Mano (1970) defines the purpose of the firm as: “Therefore, the activity 
of the firm should be thought of as the process of producing the organizational utilities by 
combining the various cooperative activities and converting them into inducements and deriving 
the next contributions from the member mentioned above. In this case all the members want to 
sustain such cooperative activities to get more satisfaction (or inducements) and less sacrifice (or 
their cooperative activities). The actual purpose of leading principle of the firm can be 
abstractly said to be the maintenance and development of the firm itself. In other words, it can 
be said to be the maintenance of the balance of the organizational utilities and their increase. 
Unless the differential between the produced organizational utilities and the inducement derived 
from its utilities is equilibrium or positive, the firm will become bankrupt at some future time.” 
Kantarelis (2007) presents an interesting summary of his research findings on the 
purpose of the firm: 
1. “The firm identifies a consumer need and develops/invents a recipe on how to satisfy 
that need; 
2. The firm makes the right decisions with respect to making or buying inputs so that it 
delivers its recipe at the lowest possible cost; 
3. The firm provides the best incentives to its stakeholders; 
4. The firm constantly and deliberately evolves through the relentless pursuit of 
competitive, organization and strategic advantage.”” 
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Let us describe the organizational structure of the firm as in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov 
VO (2013b): “Barnard (1938, 1948, 1949, 1958) introduced the two types of organizations such 
as the lateral organization and scalar (or hierarchical) organization. According to Mano (1970): 
“The firm consists of not only stockholders, employees, and managers, but also creditors, 
government authorities, consumers and material suppliers: 
1.  Stockholders contribute a cooperative action to supply long-term capital in order to 
pursue the dividends, stock dividends, and the rise of stock value. 
2. Creditors contribute a cooperative action to supply short-term capital mainly to earn 
interest.  
3. Consumers contribute a cooperative action to supply cash in order to purchase goods 
or services.  
4. Government authorities contribute a cooperative action to supply many conveniences 
in order to receive various taxes or donations, and material suppliers contribute a 
cooperative action to supply materials and facilities to get returns.  
5. Employees and managers contribute the cooperative actions which combine the 
actions contributed by other members to produce organizational utilities in       
Barnard (1938) as large as possible and divide the utilities into various inducements 
or incentives as mentioned above in order to get contributions from members. They 
contribute such actions in order to get wages, utilizing right of employee benefit 
plans, social positions, honors and authority.” 
Let us comment that the evolution of the firm includes the three clearly identified stages 
in Chandler (1962, 1977, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005), Chandler, Daems (1980), Ledenyov D 
O, Ledenyov VO (2013b): 
1) Barriers to entry creation, 
2) Strategic boundaries definition, 
3) Limits to growth evaluation. 
The existing modern theories of the firm have been created by many prominent thinkers 
and described in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov VO (2013b): 
1. “The neo-classical theory of the firm describes the various market structures, 
regulation issues, strategic pricing, barriers to entry, economies of scale and scope 
and even optimum portfolio selection of risky assets, and establishes the principle of 
profit maximisation, according to which profit is maximised, when marginal revenue 
is equal to marginal cost in the conditions of complete information. The theory does 
not allow for firm evolution in Kantarelis (2007). 
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2. The transaction cost theory of the firm states that the people begin to organise their 
production in the firms, when the transaction cost of coordinating production through 
the market exchange in the conditions of the imperfect information, is greater than 
within the firm in Coase (1937). It does not take into consideration agency costs or 
firm evolution, neither does it explain how vertical integration should take place in 
the face of investments in human assets, with unobservable value, that cannot be 
transferred in Kantarelis (2007). 
3. The managerial theory of the firm suggests that the managers would seek to 
maximise their own utility and consider the implications of this for firm behaviour in 
contrast to the profit-maximising case in Baumol (1959, 1962), Marris (1964) and 
Williamson (1966). 
4. The principal–agent theory of the firm extends the neo-classical theory of the firm 
and managerial theory of the firm by adding agents to the firm, and it considers the 
friction due to asymmetric information between owners of firms and their 
stakeholders or managers and employees; the friction between agent and principal 
requires precise measurement of agent performance and the engineering of incentive 
mechanisms. The weaknesses of the theory are many: it is difficult to engineer 
incentive mechanisms, it relies on complicated incomplete contracts (borderline 
unenforceable), it ignores transaction costs (both external and internal), and it does 
not allow for firm evolution in Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), 
Kantarelis (2007). 
5. The behavioural theory of the firm assumes that the groups of people participate in 
setting goals and making decisions on the production; inventory; market share; sales 
and profits in the firm, potentially creating conflicts. The theory proposes that the real 
firms aim to satisfy rather than maximize their results in agreement with the bounded 
rationality concept in Cyert, March (1963). 
6. The evolutionary theory of the firm states that the firm possesses unique resources: 
financial, physical, human and organizational. It sees the firm as a reactor to change 
and a creator of change for competitive advantage. The firm, as a creator of change, 
may cause creative destruction, which in turn may give birth to new industries and 
enable sectors of, or entire, economies to grow. The theory does not take to the 
account that the creative innovation process cannot be easily programmed within a 
firm or a nation in Kantarelis (2007).” 
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Let us highlight the most significant research works on the theory of the firm:           
Berle, Means (1932) discussed the modern corporation and private property problems. Coase 
(1937) described the nature of the firm. Barnard (1948) made the theoretical description of the 
organization. Penrose (1959) created the theory of the growth of the firm. Lee, Jung Hwan 
(1975) wrote an essay on the theory of the firm. Jensen, Meckling (1976) formulated the theory 
of the firm. Fama (April 1980) explained the agency problems and developed the theory of the 
firm. Kantarelis (2007) analyzed the theories of the firm. 
In addition, the theory of the firm and the related scientific topics have been 
comprehensively researched (in a chronological order) in Babbage (1832), Ueda (1904, 1937), 
Marshall (1923), Berle, Means (1932a, b), Ohlin (1933), Coase (1937), Barnard (1938, 1948, 
1949, 1958), Solow (August 1957), Modigliani, Miller (June 1958), Baumol (1959, 1962), 
Penrose (1959), Chandler (1962, 1977, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005), Chandler, Daems 
(1980), Marris (May 1963), Telser (1963), Williamson (1964, 1975, 1988), Cyert, March (1963, 
1992), Fogel (1964), Manne (1965), Stigler (1968), Mano (1968-1969, 1970-1971, 1972-1973 
1975-1976, 1978, 1980-1981, 1987, 1994, 1995), Black, Scholes (1973), Black, Cox (1976), 
Merton (1973, 1974), Lee (1975), Jensen, Meckling (1976), Jensen, Ruback (1983), Jensen 
(1986, September-October 1989, 1993, 2007), Jensen, Murphy (1990), Fama (1980), Fama, 
Jensen (1983, 1985), Demsetz (1983, 1997), Wernerfelt (1984, 1995), Lode Li (1986), Perrow 
(1986), Hart, Moore (1990), Hart (2011), Sterman (2000), Williamson (2002), Kantarelis 
(2007), Spulber (2009), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O(2013b). 
Going to the description of our new research proposals, the authors think that the firm 
receives/transmits the constant information data streams, processes the big information files and 
mainly deals with the various kinds of information in the information century, hence it makes 
sense to describe the firm in the frames of the information theory, which is formulated by the 
authors for the first time. 
The Ledenyov information theory of the firm proposes that the firm controls and 
manages the information resources, hence it is possible to theoretically model the firm as the 
operating system (OS), which controls, manages and processes the firm’s information 
resources. 
The authors think that a certain analogy can be drawn between the firm’s operating 
system in the information theory of the firm and the operating system in a microprocessor 
(quantum processor) in a computing device in the computer science. 
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In accordance with the Ledenyov information theory of the firm, the firm’s 
deterministic operating system controls and manages the firm’s information resources with 
the application of a computing kernel, which has a number of functions 
1) Making the computational operations with the information data streams, 
2) Activation and deactivation of the business tasks in the time domain, 
3) Setting the business task priorities in the time domain, 
4) Making the sequential preemptive or time-sliced scheduling of business task 
execution in the time domain, 
5) Supporting the communications between the business tasks over the time period, 
6) Managing the allocation of and access to the memory by the business tasks at 
certain time moments. 
7) Tracking the business tasks in the time domain, 
8) Supporting the multitasking execution in the time domain. 
We developed the MicroITF operating system with the following purpose to control, 
manage and process the firm’s operations by the means of the information resources processing. 
Going from a conducted comparative analysis of the source codes of the different operating 
systems, the authors came to a conclusion that the MicroITF operating system is based on the 
new innovative computing technologies, which are much more advanced than the known 
technologies, used in the near real time VxWorks operating system by WindRiver; Windows 
operating system by Microsoft; MacOS and iOS operating system by Apple, Android operating 
system by Google and Linux / Unix open source operating systems. 
The authors would like to explain that the MicroITF operating system can be emulated at 
the computing devices with the Linux, Unix, Windows, MacOS, iOS, Android, Amoeba operating 
systems with the purposes: 
1) to control the firm operation by the means of the information resources processing; 
2) to accurately characterize the director’s performance by means of a) the filtering of 
the generated/transmitted/received information by the director into the separate virtual 
channels, depending on the information content, and b) the measurement of the levels of signals 
in every virtual channel with the generated/transmitted/received information by the director, in 
the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in the 
firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements process, and 
3) to create the winning virtuous business strategies by the interlocking interconnecting 




Representation of director as processing element in analogy with digital 
signal processor in information theory of firm, and modeling of board of 
directors as electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array 
radar in information theory of firm 
 
 It is a well known fact that the information can be transmitted in the analogue and digital 
formats over the wireless, wireline and optical communication channels in agreement with the 
research findings in the information theory and the information communication theory in 
Shannon (1948), Yaglom A M, Yaglom I M (1983), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015d). 
 The authors would like to formulate the Ledenyov theory of the board of directors as well 
as the interlocking interconnecting directors’ networks in the boards of directors in the firms, 
going from the information theory and information communication theory perspectives in 
Shannon (1948), Yaglom A M, Yaglom I M (1983), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015d). 
 The authors make a logical assumption that the director works with the information in 
the board of directors in the firm, performing various kinds of manipulations with the 
information to form his opinions and make his decisions on the business related issues in the 
firm. Therefore, let us focus our attention on a possible representation of the director in terms of 
the information communication theory. The authors come up with a research idea that the 
director works to make the decisions on the a number of different business related tasks in the 
firm by doing the following things: 
1. The information sensing/detection, we can conditionally imagine that the 
director is a sensing and detecting device with the embedded optical, sound, chemical sensors 
and detectors, which can gather the information data streams in the information fields. 
2. The information filtering, it would be interesting to say that every director has 
the accumulated knowledge base, subject oriented skills developed during his education at 
university, professional experiences obtained in the process of work, can allow the director to 
tune into the selected information data streams at certain frequencies and to filter out the 
undesired information streams, working at the board of directors in the firm. The filtered 
information by every director is different, but some correlations may occur. Moreover, the 
filtered information can be distorted during the information filtering process, because of various 
factors such as the existing imperfections in the director’s professional education, professional 
experiences, and problems with the data communication channels. 
3. The information processing, we would like to make a theoretical proposition that 
the director can be represented as an information processing element with the Harvard 
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director’s mindset architecture or the von Neumann director’s mindset architecture or some 
other possible director’s mindset architectures in agreement with the digital signal processing 
and business administration sciences. Let us suppose that the classical von Neumann director’s 
mindset architecture has a single memory to store the data and program instructions; and the 
Harvard director’s mindset architecture has the two separate memories to keep the data and 
program instructions, achieving a high degree of concurrency in Hwang, Briggs (1984), Anceau 
(1986), Fountain (1987), Chen (editor) (1988), Van de Goor (1989), Prisch (1998),  
Wanhammar (1999). Thus, we firmly believe that the director’s mindset architecture may have 
the multiple distinctive impacts on the information processing volume, quality and time, resulting 
in an appearance of the different professional director’s characteristics. In other words, the 
nature of the director’s mindset architecture can partly explain an observation of variations in 
the functional performance of the board of directors, resulting in the different paths of 
enterprises evolution. 
4. The information resonant absorption, the authors want to note that the director’s 
resonant absorptive capacity in respect to the information, that is an ability to obtain and 
memorize the knowledge and information from the external environment, is defined by the 
director’s professional education, professional experiences, etc. The absorption phenomena with 
an emphasis on the knowledge creation and accumulation in the organization in the economics 
has been researched in Cohen, Levinthal (1989, 1990), Nonaka (1994), Kumar, Nti (1998), Lane, 
Lubatkin (1998), Farina (2008). The director’s resonant absorptive capacity in respect to the 
information is to some degree analogous to the resonant absorption phenomena in the condensed 
matter and soft condensed matter in the physics and chemistry, which has been researched by the 
authors early: 
a) The absorption of the different radioactive chemical elements and their isotopes in the 
soft condensed matter (the coal granules of different geometric shapes, the coal dust particles 
of micro- and nano- sizes) at the sound frequencies have been researched in the nuclear physics 
in Neklyudov, Dovbnya, Dikiy, Ledenyov O P, Lyashko (2014), Ledenyov O P, Neklyudov 
(2013), Neklyudov, Dovbnya, Dikiy, Ledenyov O P, Lyashko (2013), Neklyudov, Ledenyov O P, 
Fedorova, Poltinin (2013a, b), Neklyudov, Fedorova, Poltinin, Ledenyov O P (2013), Ledenyov 
O P, Neklyudov, Poltinin, Fedorova (2012a, b), Neklyudov, Ledenyov O P, Fedorova, Poltinin 
(2012), etc. 
b) The absorption of the electromagnetic signals in the condensed matter (the high pure 
metals and superconductors) at the ultrasonic frequencies has been investigated in the solid 
state physics at the in Ledenyov O P (2012a, b, c), Ledenyov V O, Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov O P, 
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Tikhonovsky (2012), Ledenyov O P, Fursa V P (2012), Shepelev, Ledenyov O P, Filimonov 
(2012a, b, c, d, e), etc. 
c) The absorption of the electromagnetic signals in the sub-surface layers in the 
condensed matter (the high temperature superconducting ceramics and dielectrics) at the ultra 
high frequencies has been studied in the solid state physics in Ledenyov D O, Mazierska, Allen, 
Jacob (2012), Leong, Mazierska, Jacob, Ledenyov D O, Batt (2012), Mazierska, Ledenyov D O, 
Jacob, Krupka (2012), Jacob, Mazierska, Ledenyov D O, Krupka (2012), Mazierska, Krupka, 
Jacob, Ledenyov D O (2012), Jacob, Mazierska, Leong, Ledenyov D O, Krupka (2012), Jacob, 
Mazierska, Krupka, Ledenyov D O, Takeuchi (2012), Mazierska, Jacob, Ledenyov D O, Krupka 
(2012), Ledenyov D O (2013), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2014), Mazierska, Leong, 
Ledenyov, Rains, Zuchowski, Krupka (2014), etc. 
5. the information analysis, the authors would like to explain that an application of 
various types of logics, including the inductive, deductive and abductive logics in the creative 
imperative integrative intelligent conceptual co-lateral adaptive logarithmic thinking process 
in Martin (1998-1999, 2005-2006) in the frames of the econophysical econometrical analysis 
in Schumpeter (1906, 1933), Bowley (1924), Box, Jenkins (1970), Grangel, Newbold (1977), 
Van Horne (1984), Taylor S (1986), Tong (1986, 1990), Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lee, Lutkepol 
(1988), Hardle (1990), Grangel, Teräsvirta (1993), Pesaran, Potter (1993), Banerjee, Dolado, 
Galbraith, Hendry (1993), Hamilton (1994), Karatzas, Shreve (1995), Campbell, Lo, 
MacKinlay (1997), Rogers, Talay (1997), Hayashi (2000), Durbin, Koopman (2000, 2002, 
2012), Ilinski (2001), Greene (2003), Koop (2003), Davidson, MacKinnon (2004), Campbell, 
Lo, MacKinlay (1996), Vialar, Goergen (2009) is quite essential. 
6. the decision making, let us highlight the fact that the decision making must be 
conducted with the consideration of the obtained analytic results in the certain time period, 
using the reasoning techniques with an application of the theoretical and practical knowledge 
base, which is accumulated by the director. 
 Therefore, it is logical to assume that in view of the fact that the director makes the 
information sensing, filtering, processing, resonant absorption, analysis, decision making, 
strategy creation, hence the director can be empirically represented as a processing element 
with the Harvard or von Neumann director’s mindset architectures in line with the digital 
signal processing science as in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (January 22 2015). 
 The authors proposed a concise definition of the board of directors in Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov V O (January 22 2015): “a group of elected appointed directors (institutional 
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agents), who control all the business activities by the management team (corporate agents) 
toward the firm’s business development, constitute a board of directors.” 
 We have already emphasized that the standard board of directors in the firm can be 
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where di,j is the position of a director’s seat in the matrix, which describes the standard board of 
directors in the firm. 
We also highlighted a fact that the board of directors composition dynamics over the 
time can be described by the generalized formula as in Santella, Drago, Polo (November 11 
2007), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (January 22 2015) 
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( )en t  is the number of directors entrants at time ti, 
( )ex t  is the number of directors exits at time ti, 
,c tboard  is the board of directors size at time ti, 
c is the company, 
i is the director. 
Heimbrandt (2007) writes: “As the modern firm has continued to grow and its owner base 
has widened, the owners’ opportunities to exert influence has diminished. While the board of 
directors is a strategic resource available to management it is also the owners’ primary tool for 
exercising control. To a large extent research on the role of the board of directors has focused on 
the relationship between various characteristics of the board and the firm’s financial result. 
Research literature within the field of corporate governance has established three primary roles 
for the board of directors: setting strategy, controlling management and being a resource 
available to management. The vast majority of research within the field is primarily based on 
investor owned firms.” 
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Going to the topics of the information analysis and subsequent decision making by the 
director in the board of directors in the firm, let us focus on a possible representation of the 
board of directors in terms of the information communication theory. In the predefined set of 
coordinates, the board of directors with a certain number of elected appointed directors can be 
theoretically represented as 
1. An electronically scanned electronically steered phased array radar with a 
certain number of active elements (directors), which can sense the information and tune into the 
selected information carrier frequencies bands in the information fields; 
2. A filters bank with a certain number of information filters, which tunes into the 
certain data streams frequencies and reject the unnecessary information streams in the adjacent 
channels over all the frequencies range; 
3. An array of digital signal processors with the Harvard / von Neumann 
architectures, which process the digitized data streams, using the predefined information 
processing algorithms, which can be implemented in the hardware or the software; 
4. A memory chipset with the ultra fast short and long term memories, which store 
the absorbed information and provides a fast access to the absorbed information. 
In other words, we think that the board of directors in the corporate governance system 
can be theoretically represented as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased 
array radar with a certain number of the electronic elements/devices (directors, who can be 
modeled as electronic devices with the active antenna elements, filters banks, digital signal 
processors, memory chipsets in agreement with the microwave and digital signal processing 
sciences). 
Let us take a general look on the board of directors position and characteristics within 
the firm. Fig. 1 shows the relationship between ownership structure, composition of the board 
and firm performance in Desender (2009). 
 
Fig. 1. Relationship between ownership structure, composition of the board and firm 
performance (after Desender (2009)). 
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Fig. 2 demonstrates a relationship between the ownership structure, board composition 




Fig. 2. The relationship between ownership structure, board composition and external audit 
services (after Desender, García-Cestona, Crespi, Aguilera (November 23, 2009)). 
 
Tab. 1 presents the independent variables description in Ştefănescu (March 2013). 
 
 
Tab. 1 Independent variable description (Ştefănescu (March 2013)). 
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There is a big number of variables to characterize the board of directors (see below).    
Tab. 2 shows the corporate governance variables definitions in Horváth, Spirollari (2012). 
 
Tab. 2. The definitions of corporate governance variables (after Horváth, Spirollari (2012)). 
Tab. 3 depicts the firm performance variables definitions in Al-Matari Y A, Al-Swidi, 
Fadzil, Al-Matari E M (2012). 
 
Tab. 3. Firm performance variables definitions 
(after Al-Matari Y A, Al-Swidi, Fadzil, Al-Matari E M (2012). 
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Tab. 4 shows the main interpretations (definitions) of board involvement in the strategic 
process in Ghaya (October 2011). 
 
Tab. 4. Main interpretations (definitions) of board involvement in strategic process 
(after Ghaya (October 2011)). 
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Tab. 5 describes a set of board activities in the steps of the strategic decision making 
process in Ghaya (October 2011)). 
 
Tab. 5. Set of board activities in the steps of the strategic decision making process 




Tab. 6 provides information on the synthesis of board of directors’ contributions in the 
corporate governance theories in Ghaya (October 2011)). 
 
Tab. 6. Synthesis of board of directors’ contributions in the corporate governance theories 
(after Ghaya (October 2011)). 
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Tab. 7. Shows the characteristics of the board of directors in Ghaya (October 2011). 
 
Tab. 7. Characteristics of the board of directors (after Ghaya (October 2011)). 
 
Fig. 3 proposes an operational model of board involvement in strategic decision making 
process in Ghaya (Octobre 2011). 
 
Fig. 3. Operational model of board involvement in strategic decision making process 
(after Ghaya (October 2011)). 
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Let us now discuss the board of director’s performance evaluation problem in details. 
Evaluating the board of directors competences, professional capabilities and work performance, 
Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006) suggest: “The degree of effectiveness of a board should be 
appreciated taking into account the business structure, ownership and institutional model of the 
firm, on the one hand, and the characteristics of its board, in terms of its composition, structure 
and skills, on the other hand.” 
Fig. 4 shows the perspectives and tools for the evaluation of the board of directors in 
Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006). 
 
Fig. 4. Perspectives and tools for evaluating board of directors 
(after Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006)). 
 
Fig. 5 provides some information on the procedure for calculating the performance of 
board of directors in Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006). 
 
Fig. 5. Procedure for calculating the performance of board of directors 




Fig. 6 compiles a checklist for surveying the institutional and organizational 
characteristics in Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006)). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Checklist for surveying the institutional and organizational characteristics 
(after Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006)). 
 
Fig. 7 depicts a procedure for the measurements of the board professional skills in 
Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006)). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Procedure for measuring the professional skills of the board 




Let us explain that the following original research proposals on an accurate 
characterization of the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors’ networks in the 
boards of directors in the firms have been formulated in the corporate governance research in 
Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a), namely the authors suggested that: 
1) Transmitted/Received information data-stream measurements, 
2) Transmitted/Received information bit error rate measurements, 
have to be used to accurately characterize the interlocking interlinking interconnecting 
directors networks in addition to the well known parameters such as: 
a) Director’s boards seats accumulation number, 
b) Overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks configuration 
c) Centrality, 
d) Freeman degree, 
e) Betweenness. 
In other words, the authors suggested that: “the information, which is generated, 
transmitted and received by the director in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking 
directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms can accurately characterize the 
overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks performance, and tell the true 
story about the director’s competence and effectiveness, impacting the involved firms’ 
valuations,” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). It was also explained that: “The director 
can have a big director’s boards seats accumulation number, an advanced overlapping 
interconnecting interlocking director’s professional networks configuration, a high degree of 
centrality, however, at the same time, the director can generate, transmit, receive the low 
information data streams (the information data flows) in the advanced overlapping 
interconnecting interlocking director’s professional networks, behaving as a passive observer 
and making the little or no useful contributions to the boards of directors work in the 
considered firms,” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). The authors came to a logical 
conclusion that: “the information, which is generated, transmitted and received by the director 
in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors 
in the firms is the only important parameter, which can accurately characterize the director’s 
competence, efficiency and effectiveness during his/her work assignments in the boards of 
directors in the firms. In any firm, the work performance, shown by every director, will 
ultimately impact the work performance, demonstrated by the board of directors, which will 
certainly be reflected in the firm’s valuation in Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006), Black, Kim 
(2011),” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). The attention was drawn to the fact that: “We 
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do believe that the generated, transmitted, and received information data streams in the 
interlocking interlinking interconnecting directors’ networks have a highly asymmetric 
nature, because of some reasons. In our opinion, every director has the different education, 
professional experience, accumulated knowledge base and can allocate the different amounts 
of time to work at the boards of directors in the firms, hence the director will generate, 
transmit, receive the various information data streams (the information data flows), resulting 
in the asymmetric information data streams appearance in the interlocking interlinking 
interconnecting directors’ networks in the boards of directors in the firms”, in Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov V O (2015a). It makes sense to note that the above propositions in Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov V O (2015a) have been made, considering the present research achievements in the 
wireline information communication networks (ADSL), wireless information communication 
networks (GSM, WCDMA, UMTS), the optical information communication networks (SONET, 
ATM, all optical CDMA), which can be accurately characterized by both 
1) the transmitted/received data stream measurements, and 
2) the existing bit error rate measurements (BER), using the eye diagram and the special 
measurement equipment, in accordance with the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
technical requirements.  
Let us add that a research assumption that the positive and negative feedback loops can 
quite possibly lead to the destructive coordination among the directors by eliminating the 
randomness element and by introducing the greater uniformity in the pursuing business 
strategies has been proposed in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). It was stated that: “We 
would like to emphasis that the conducted empirical research reveals another interesting fact 
that the positive and negative feedback loops, which can be created by the interlocking 
directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms, can quite possibly lead to the 
destructive coordination among the directors in the boards of directors in the firms by 
eliminating the randomness element and introducing the greater uniformity in the pursuing 
business strategies (the destructive coordination term is well described in Whitehead (2011, 
2014)),” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). We would like to clarify that the total risk 
calculation, using the similar risk management techniques in the financial institutions, can result 
in an increase of systemic risk and a possible systemic collapse of financial institutions due to the 
destructive coordination presence. 
Let us highlight the fact that the problem of stability in the overlapping interconnecting 
interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms has been considered from 
the econophysics point of view in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). The authors wrote: 
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“We think that the stability of interlocking interconnecting directors’ network depends on the 
nature of stochastic dynamic processes in the interlocking interconnecting directors’ network, 
hence it can be impacted by the election / appointment / introduction of a new directors into 
the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in 
the firms in the time domain in Anishenko, Vadivasova, Astakhov (1999), Kuznetsov (2001). 
The stability is an important parameter in all types of modern networks in the economics, 
finances, electronics, energy sector, and information communication industry in Page, 
Wooders, Kamat (2005). For example, it is a well known fact that a fast random addition of 
the energy consumers to the energy distribution networks may result in a shift of the energy 
distribution networks out of a stable state, because of the origination of the stochastic dynamic 
resonance. The same processes can have place in the case of the electronic circuits with the 
interconnected networks of electronic components, hence the stability of electronic circuits is 
considered as an important parameter. The stability of wireless, wireline and optical 
communications networks with the millions of active users is assumed to be quite important 
parameter as well,” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). 
The special MicroID software program to compute the real-world director’s election / 
appointment numbers in the boards of directors in the firms, was developed in Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov V O (2015a): “Using the knowledge base in the probability theory in De Laplace 
(1812), Bunyakovsky (1846), Chebyshev (1846, 1867, 1891), Markov (1890, 1899, 1900, 1906, 
1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913), Kolmogorov (1938, 1985, 1986), Wiener (1949), Brush 
(1968, 1977), Shiryaev (1974, 1988, 1995), Pugachev (1979), the authors derived the 
appropriate universal formula to compute the probability number of the additional directorship 
mandates issues, depending on a set of already existing directorship mandates in the case of the 
interconnecting interlocking directors’ networks in the boards of directors in the firms,             
P(b + 1|b), in Milakovíc, Raddant, Birg (2009), Alfarano, Milakovíc (2009); and developed the 
MicroID software program, which makes the actual probabilistic prediction toward the 
director’s election / appointment in the boards of directors in the firms, taking to the 
consideration both the director’s technical characteristics and the interconnecting interlocking 
director’s network parameters. We tested the MicroID software program, improved the 
computing recursive algorithm, and evaluated the accuracy of developed prediction models, 
comparing the obtained computing results with the real-world director’s election / appointment 
numbers in the boards of directors in the firms in the considered cases of research interest.” 
In this research paper, let us focus our research attention on our most interesting 
research proposal to introduce the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements to accurately 
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characterize the director’s performance in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking 
directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O 
(2015a). The authors made the following research proposal: “We propose to introduce the 
Quality of Service measurements scale for the directors’ competence and effectiveness 
measurements during their work performance evaluation in the boards of directors in the 
firms, going from the accurate characterization of the generated, transmitted and received 
information streams by the director in the boards of directors in the firms over a certain period 
of time,” in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2015a). 
Therefore, in the present research article, we would like to take a few steps forward and 
describe the innovative advanced technology to accurately characterize the director’s 
performance in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards 
of directors in the firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements process, which has 
been developed by the authors during the research in the last fifteen years. We make the 
Ledenyov Quality of Service evaluation method proposition to filter the 
generated/transmitted/received information by the director into the separate virtual 
information channels, depending on the information content, and to measure the level of 
signal in every virtual channel with the purpose to accurately characterize the director’s 
performance in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards 
of directors in the firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements process. For 
example, using the MicroITF software program, we can investigate a certain number of 
directors in the boards of directors in the firms at the same time and analyse the following 
director’s virtual information communication channels, which are 
generated/transmitted/received by the directors in the boards of directors in the firms, in our 
measurements: 
1) The strategic generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
2) The tactical generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
3) The numerical generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
4) The text generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
5) The audio generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
6) The video generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 
7) The graphic generated/transmitted/received information virtual channel, 




The above Ledenyov Quality of Service evaluation method is based on the innovative 
advanced technology developed for the spread spectrum wireless communication networks, the 
spread spectrum optical communication networks and computer networks, where the different 
virtual information communication channels can be practically created with the application of 
1) the various signal spreading codes (WCDMA wireless/optical communication 
networks), and/or 
2) the different signal coding schemes in the multilayered protocols stacks (the 
computer networks) 
over the same physical channel with the certain frequencies bandwidth, in the time domain. The 
levels of signals in the different virtual channels can be measured precisely, providing the 
necessary data on the director’s Quality of Service in the boards of directors in the firms in an 
analogy with the QofS measurements in the spread spectrum wireless communication networks 
and the spread spectrum optical communication networks.  
In this research publication, we would like to discuss shortly the important obtained 
research results by saying that the special software program MicroITF has been created by the 
authors to accurately characterize the director’s performance by means of 
1) the filtering of the generated/transmitted/received information by the director into 
the separate virtual channels, depending on the information content, and 
2) the measurement of the levels of signals in every virtual channel with the 
generated/transmitted/received information by the director, in the overlapping interconnecting 
interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms during the Quality of 
Service (QofS) measurements process. 
Presently, we can only report the preliminary research results by saying that MicroITF 
software program has been developed, tested and applied successfully to make the QofS 
measurements as far as the selected directors in the firms, corporations in Europe, North 
America, Asia and Australia is concerned. 
 The directors’ characteristics, boards of directors’ characteristics, interlocking 
interconnecting directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms and the related 
scientific topics have been extensively researched (in a chronological order) in Brandeis (1915, 
1933), Berle (1932), Berle, Means (1932), Dodd (1932), Luce, Perry (1949), Selznick (1949, 
1957), Ford, Fulkerson (1956), Mills (1956), Hopkins (1964), Vance (1964, 1968, 1983), 
Williamson (1964, 1975, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1996, 2002, 2007), Koontz (1967), Milgram (1967), 
Travers (1968), Dooley (1969), Harary (1969), Miliband (1969), Zald (1969), Domhoff (1970), 
Bunting, Barbour (Autumn 1971), Bunting (1976), Mace (1971, 1972, 1986), Child (1972), 
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(1980, 1997), Pennings (1980), Provan (1980), Radcliff (1980), Boje, Whetten (1981), 
Linderberger, Ross (1981), Mintz, Schwartz (1981, 1985), Bearden, Mintz (1985), Mizruchi, 
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(1984), Hambrick, Mason (1984), Lease, McConnell, Mikkelson (1984), Ornstein (1984), Scott, 
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(1991, 1992), Zajac (1988, 1996), Connors (1989), Fosberg (1989), Lorsch, MacIver (1989), 
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Winning virtuous strategy creation by interlocking interconnecting 
interlinking directors in board of directors in firm in accordance with 
information theory of firm 
 
 Exploring the research problem on the winning virtuous strategy creation by the 
interlocking interconnecting interlinking directors in the board of directors in the firm in the 
frames of the information theory of firm, the authors prefer to use the research approach by the 
Ledenyov’s school of scientific thinking, which complements the empirical philosophical 
intuitive logical opinions on the strategy creation issues, which have been nurtured and 
expressed by the Porter’s strategy institute, with the most innovative econophysical 
econometrical information-technology-driven thoughts on the origins of winning successful 
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strategies, proposed by the Ledenyov’s school of scientific thinking. One of the interesting 
problems to understand is: How can the board of directors create the winning successful 
business strategies for the company (organization) in the information theory of the firm? 
Answering the above question, let the authors formulate the Ledenyov theory on the winning 
virtuous business strategies creation by the directors in the boards of directors in the firms at 
the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial economic 
systems with the induced nonlinearities. 
The Ledenyov theory postulates that the director with the highest information 
absorption capacity, who experience the phenomenon of resonant - type absorption of 
information, is able to create the winning virtuous strategies through the decision making 
process on the available business choices in the diffusion - type financial economic system 
with the induced nonlinearities, applying the econophysical econometrical analysis 
techniques in Schumpeter (1906, 1933), Bowley (1924), Box, Jenkins (1970), Grangel, 
Newbold (1977), Van Horne (1984), Taylor S (1986), Tong (1986, 1990), Judge, Hill, 
Griffiths, Lee, Lutkepol (1988), Hardle (1990), Grangel, Teräsvirta (1993), Pesaran, Potter 
(1993), Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, Hendry (1993), Hamilton (1994), Karatzas, Shreve 
(1995), Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay (1997), Rogers, Talay (1997), Hayashi (2000), Durbin, 
Koopman (2000, 2002, 2012), Ilinski (2001), Greene (2003), Koop (2003), Davidson, 
MacKinnon (2004), Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay (1996), Vialar, Goergen (2009) and using the 
creative imperative integrative intelligent conceptual co-lateral adaptive logarithmic thinking 
process with the use of the inductive, deductive and abductive logics in Martin (1998-1999, 
2005-2006) in the frames of the strategic choice structuring process, that is the winning 
through the distinctive choices process in Porter (1979, 1980, 1982a, b, 1983, 1985, 1987a, b, 
1991, 1994a, b, 1996a, b, 1997, 2001a, b, 2008, 2013), Porter, Harrigan (1981), Porter, Salter 
(1982), Montgomery, Porter (1991), Porter, Rivkin (2000), Porter, Sakakibara (2004), Anand, 
Bradley, Ghemawat, Khanna, Montgomery, Porter, Rivkin, Rukstad, Wells, Yoffie (2005), 
Porter, Kramer (2006), Hill, Jones (1998, 2004), Martin (1998-1999b, 2004, 2005-2006a, b, 
2009), Moldoveanu, Martin (2001), Lafley, Martin (2013), Grant (2001), Choo, Bontis (2002), 
Drejer (2002), Sadler (2003), Roney (2004), Ireland, Hoskisson, Hitt (2006), Besanko, 
Shanley, Dranove (2007), Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson (2007), Gavetti, Rivkin (2007), Teece, 
Winter (2007), aiming both to get an increased business valuation (a return premium) and to 
make a positive social impact in the local community and society in the frames of the socially 
responsible investment (SRI) process that integrates social, environmental, and ethical 
considerations into investment decision making in the real sector of economy in Waddock, 
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Graves, (1994), Arora, Gangopadhyay (1995), Sparkes (1998, 2004, 2008), Johnson, Greening 
(1999), Lyndenburg (2002), Cox, Brammer, Millington (2004), Kotler, Lee (2005), Louche, 
Lydenberg (2006), McWilliams, Siegel, Wright (2006), Scholtens (2006), Cespa, Cestone 
(2007), Cumming, Johan (2007), Williams (2007), Hull, Rothenberg (2008), Reinhardt, 
Stavins, Vietor (2008), Renneboog, Horst, Zhang (2008), Arjalies (2010), Crifo, Mottis (2010), 
Morrell, Clark (2010), Baron, Harjoto, Jo (2011), Crifo, Forget (February, 2012). 
Making the concluding comments on the strategy creation issue, the authors think that 
the different levels of the information sensing, information filtering, information processing, 
information absorption, information analysis and decision making with the obtained information 
by the director may have the certain positive or negative impacts on the director’s winning 
virtuous strategy creation ability in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors 
networks in the boards of directors in the firms. 
Of course, the most complicated task for every wise director is to adjust to the optimal 
levels of the information sensing, information filtering, information processing, information 
absorption, information analysis, decision making, which can allow the winning virtuous 
strategy creation in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the 
boards of directors in the firms. We would like to mention that the excessive or insufficient 
levels of the information sensing, information filtering, information processing, information 
absorption, information analysis by the director may result in the bifurcations and chaos 
appearances in the frames of a decision making process on the winning virtuous strategy 
creation in the case of presence of the considered overlapping interconnecting interlocking 
directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms. 
The strategy creation by the board of directors in the firm and the related scientific topics 
have been researched (in a chronological order) in Chandler (1962, 1998; 1977, 1993; 1994; 
2001; 2005), Chandler , Daems (1980),  Andrews (1971a, b, 1980, 1981a, b, 1984), Rumelt 
(1974, 1982), Porter (1979, 1980, 1982a, b, 1983, 1985, 1987a, b, 1991, 1994a, b, 1996a, b, 
1997, 2001a, b, 2008, December 2013), Porter, Harrigan (1981), Porter, Salter (1982), 
Montgomery, Porter (1991), Porter, Rivkin (2000), Porter, Sakakibara (2004), Anand, Bradley, 
Ghemawat, Khanna, Montgomery, Porter, Rivkin, Rukstad, Wells, Yoffie (2005), Porter, Kramer 
(2006), Porter, Heppelmann (November 2014), Schendel, Hofer (1979), Yelle (1979), Dess, 
Davis (1984), Schwenk (1984), Pitol-Belin (1984), Hambrick (1985), Palepu (1985), Barney 
(1986, 1991), Huff, Reger (1987), Hill, Snell (1988), Hill, Jones (1998, 2004), Baysinger, 
Hoskisson (1989), Rue, Holland (1989), Fombrum, Shanley (1990), Pearson (1990), Ansoff 
(1991), Goold (1991), Goold, Luchs (1993), Goold et al (1994), Goold, Campbell (September, 
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October 1998), Alexander, Goold, Collis, Campbell, Lieberthal, Montgomery, Palepu, Prahalad, 
Stalk, Khanna, Hart, Shulman, Evans (1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999), Yip (1992, 1998, 
2000, 2007), Campbell et al (1995), Johnson, Scholes (1997), Johnson, Scholes, Whittington 
(1998), Johnson, Scholes, Whittington (2002, 2003), McKiernan (1997), Child, Faulkner (1998), 
Martin (1998-1999, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007a,b, 2008, 2009), Moldoveanu, Martin (2001), 
Lafley, Martin (2013), Shiryaev (1999), Laffont, Tirole (1999), Grant (2001), Welch (2001a, b), 
Choo, Bontis (2002), Drejer (2002), Sadler (2003), Gavetti, Levinthal (2004), Gavetti, Rivkin 
(2007), Roney (2004), Thietart, Xuereb (2005), Godard (2006), Ireland, Hoskisson, Hitt (2006), 
Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson (2007), Lorino, Tarondeau (2006), Besanko, Shanley, Dranove (2007), 




The article formulates the information theory of firm, introduces the concept of firm as 
an operating system, which controls the firm’s operation by the means of the information 
resources processing, in an analogy with the operating system at a microprocessor in the 
computing devices, represents the director as an information processing element, describes the 
board of directors as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar, 
considers the scientific problem of strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting 
overlapping directors in the boards of directors in the firms in the economic system with the 
induced nonlinearities. 
We highlight a fact that the director makes the information sensing, filtering, processing, 
resonant absorption, analysis, decision making, strategy creation, hence it can be empirically 
represented as a processing element in a digital signal processor with the Harvard or von 
Neumann director’s mindset architectures in line with the digital signal processing science. 
We think that the board of directors in corporate governance system can be theoretically 
represented as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar with a 
certain number of electronic devices (directors, who can be modeled as electronic devices with 
the active antenna elements, filters banks, digital signal processors, memory chipsets in 
agreement with the microwave and digital signal processing sciences). 
Using all the proposed theoretical assumptions, we propose the Ledenyov theory on the 
winning virtuous strategies creation by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the 
boards of directors in the modern firms in a harmony with the management science. 
We developed the MicroITF operation system and software programs: 
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1) the operation system to control the firm operation by means of the information 
resources near-real-time processing in the modern firms in the case of the diffusion - type 
financial economic system with the induced nonlinearities. The operating system is based on 
the accumulated knowledge of source code architecture for the near real time VxWorks operating 
system by WindRiver. 
2) the software program to accurately characterize the director’s performance by means 
of a) the filtering of the generated/transmitted/received information by the director into the 
separate virtual channels, depending on the information content, and b) the measurement of 
the levels of signals in every virtual channel with the generated/transmitted/received 
information by the director, in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks 
in the boards of directors in the firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements 
process; and 
3) the software program to create the winning virtuous business strategies by the 
interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the modern firms in the 
case of the diffusion - type financial economic system with the induced nonlinearities, using 
the patented recursive artificial intelligence. 
The MicroITF operating system and software programs can be emulated/installed at the 
computing devices with the Linux, Unix, Windows, MacOS, iOS, Android, Amoeba operating 
systems. 
The authors think that the information theory of firm will improve our understanding on 




The directors in the boards of directors in the firms face a number of business challenges 
as a result of appearing disruptions in the economics in an information age. In this introductory 
condensed research article, the authors use an original research approach in an attempt to create 
the information theory of the firm and to find a possible solution for the strategy creation 
problem, which has to be solved by the directors in the boards of directors during the strategic 
governance of the firms. 
The international students prepared the brief abstracts of our invited lectures at the 
leading universities around the World over the last two decade, and then the authors combined 
our lecture notes with the brief abstracts of our invited lectures, aiming to write a research 
article. We also decided to include some our thoughts, expressed during the Q&A sessions after 
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the presented lectures and kindly recorded by our students. In addition, the authors included the 
most interesting comments, professional advises, private opinions on the research subject by the 
directors of firms, recorded during a few thousands of business meetings in Europe, North 
America and Asia. In our opinion, the presented research findings may be in the scope of interest 
by the MBA students, professors in the business administration, management, finances, 
economics sciences, directors in the boards of directors, chairmen of the boards of directors, 
subject experts, and business leaders, who would like to stay up to the date on the recent 
developments in the business administration science. 
The first author’s knowledge on the origins of the nonlinearities in the complex systems 
in the electrical, electronic, computer and financial engineering has been obtained during the 
intensive innovative scientific collaboration with Prof. Janina E. Mazierska, Personal Chair, 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, James Cook University, Townsville, 
Australia and former Dean, Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, James Cook 
University, Townsville, Australia, and former IEEE Director Region 10 in Australia, and IEEE 
Fellow. The first author would like to acknowledge Prof. Janina E. Mazierska by expressing his 
sincere gratitude for the kind scientific advices on how to develop the logical mathematical 
analysis skills, the scientific problems analytic solving ability and the abstract scientific thinking 
to tackle the complex scientific problems on the nonlinearities in the microwave 
superconductivity as well as on the nonlinearities in the economics, applying the 
interdisciplinary scientific knowledge together with the advanced computer modeling techniques 
in the course of the cutting-edge highly innovative research projects at James Cook University in 
Townsville in Queensland in Australia in 2000 – 2015 after the graduation from V. N. Karazyn 
Kharkov National University in Kharkov in Ukraine in 1994 – 1999. 
There would be appropriate to say that, in an information age, the first author’s special 
efforts have been primarily directed towards the scientific information gathering, systematization 
and detailed analysis in the frames of this research project on the business strategy creation by 
the directors in the boards of directors in the firms; hence, the first author would like to thank 
the professional stuff at the central library at James Cook University in Townsville, Queensland, 
Australia for providing the first author with all the necessary technical support in relation to the 
literature search on the subjects of his multidisciplinary research interest in the electronic 
research databases at Australian universities, replying to the numerous chaotic research requests 
timely, and making everything possible to assist with the completion of the highly innovative 
advanced research on the business strategy creation by the directors in the boards of directors in 
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the firms, which has been conducted at the James Cook University in Townsville, Queensland in 
Australia in 2000 – 2015. 
The first author would like to comment that the informative scientific discussions on the 
business strategy creation by the directors in the boards of directors in the firms, which have 
been conducted by the first author with the M.Sc. students, Ph.D. candidates, professors, visiting 
scientists and other faculty members during the numerous scientific seminars and brain storm 
research meetings at James Cook University in Townsville in Queensland in Australia, are 
generously appreciated, because these valuable scientific opinions exchanges encouraged the 
first author to generate the new original scientific ideas and make the creative imperative 
integrative intelligent conceptual co-lateral adaptive logarithmic thinking with the application of 
the inductive, deductive and abductive logics analysis as far as the business strategy creation by 
the directors in the boards of directors in the firms, is concerned. 
A certain part of an introductory condensed research article has been written during the 
first author’s yachting with the Australian friends in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia and in 
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, when a number of the creative research ideas and important 
research findings on the business strategy creation by the directors in the boards of directors in 
the firms, came to his mind. Most of the ideas have been discussed with the Australian friends, 
when on the yachts. Sometimes, the thoughtful discussions have been further conducted during 
the “numerous meetings without the ties” with the great Australian philosophers, professors, 
scientists, businessmen, lawyers, governmental officials and political leaders in the relaxing 
trusted mutual-respect atmosphere, characterized by the pluralism of research opinions on the 
topics of interest, during the Yarra valley, Mornington-Peninsula, and Hunter valley limo wine 
tours (www.yarravalleylimowinetours.com.au, www.huntervalleylimotours.com.au). All these 
exchanges by the scientific opinions fascinated the first author’s mind, stimulated the abstract 
thinking on the presented assumptions, and inspired to work consistently to complete the writing 
of this highly innovative condensed research article on the business strategy creation by the 
directors in the boards of directors in the firms, at James Cook University in Townsville, 
Brisbane, and Gold Coast in Queensland in Australia as well as in Melbourne and Sydney in 
Australia in 2015. 
The first author would like to thank cordially all the European universities rectors, 
universities deans, distinguished professors, world renowned financiers, reputable economists 
and well respected businessmen for many tens of highly creative and productive business 
meetings during the first author’s global intellectual journey over the European capitals, 
including: Warsaw, Poland; Berlin, Germany; Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Brussels, Belgium; 
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Luxemburg, Luxemburg; Paris, France; Barcelona, Madrid, Spain; and Coimbra, Lisbon, Porto, 
Portugal in October, 2014. It was nice to meet and discuss all the problems of mutual research 
interest with the old European Friends, coming from Brisbane, Australia. 
It is not possible to underestimate an influence by the classic music on the development 
of strategic thinking skills, hence a visit by the first author to the City of Vienna in Austria in 
Europe during the Christmas and New Year festivities in December 2014- January 2015 had a 
quite positive overall impact on the completion of research article writing. 
The intensive research work on the information theory of the firm in combination with the 
sport training exercises has been conducted by the first author during his visits to the skiing 
tourism destinations in Bukovel and in Dragobrat in Western Ukraine in March 2015. The fresh 
air, pine trees wood, delicious meals and high level service at Radisson hotel contributed to the 
research article writing completion and software development. In addition, during the first 
author’s visit to Ukraine in March 2015, it was nice to see the beautiful architecture of old 
buildings at University of Czernowitz, where Prof. Joseph Alois Schumpeter had been worked on 
the theory of economic development in 1909 – 1911. 
After the graduation from V. N. Karazyn Kharkov National University in Kharkov in 
Ukraine in 1988-1993, the second author worked on the research programs in a number of 
universities and institutions around the World. Considering this research paper, the second 
author would like to kindly acknowledge the numerous private communications with the 
participants of the V. Ya. Bunyakovsky international conference with the special focus on the     
V. Ya. Bunyakovsky’s research contributions to the mathematical theory of probability and its 
modern applications in the econophysics and econometrics, which had place during a tour to the 
Town of Bar, Vinnytsya Region, State of Ukraine in the time of the conference, organized by the 
Institute of Mathematics of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), Kyiv, Ukraine on 
August 20 – 21, 2004. Absorbing the brilliant research ideas during a fruitful exchange by the 
scientific opinions among the conference attendees, the second author came up with a 
remarkable conclusion that the foundations of the mathematical theory of probability by V. Ya. 
Bunyakovsky enable us to perform a more accurate scientific analysis and characterization of the 
complex research problems on the business strategy creation by the directors in the boards of 
directors in the firms. The first author has been worked on the research article, discussing the 
points of mutual research interest with the second author, during his regular visits to the Town of 
Bar, Vinnytsya Region, State of Ukraine over the recent years. 
It is a real tremendous pleasure to comment that some fundamental issues on the business 
strategy creation by the directors in the boards of directors in the firms have been researched by 
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the second author during his intensive research assignments at the Rotman School of 
Management, University of Toronto, Canada in 1998 – 1999 and 2005 – 2006. The second 
author met with many hundreds of North American Corporations Presidents, Board of Directors 
Chairmen, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Chief Operating 
Officers (COOs) and visited the Research Triangle Park high-tech cluster near Durham in North 
Caroline in the USA as well as the Kanata high-tech cluster near Ottawa in Ontario; the Calgary 
high-tech cluster in Calgary in Alberta; the Richmond high-tech cluster near Vancouver in 
British Columbia, the Montreal high-tech cluster in Montreal in Quebec in the North America in 
1998 – 2006, making his innovative research on the business strategy creation by the directors 
in the boards of directors in the firms. The obtained information has been researched and 
analyzed by the second author at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
Canada, which was a global hub of innovative scientific thinking in the economics and finances 
mainly due to the high level organizational and personal efforts by Prof. Roger L. Martin, 
former Dean, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada, who strongly 
supported and facilitated the initiation of innovative research and the creation of intensive 
business education courses in Canada on that time. It is important to underline the fact that the 
Prof. Roger L. Martin, former Dean, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
Canada took a right decision to support our innovative research by all the available resources at 
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada, including the library, computer 
laboratory and professional management consulting. Indeed, the Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto, Canada was a global financial and economic center of gravity on that 
time, where the highly innovative research work has been conducted by the second author from 
the early morning hours until the deep night, being occasionally interrupted by the thoughtful 
long hours scientific discussions on a variety of research problems in the finances with        
Profs. John C. Hull and Roger L. Martin, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
Canada in 1998 – 1999 and in 2005 - 2006. It makes sense to note that, in some cases, the 
intensive research discussions and numerous consultations have been continued during our 
frequent meetings at the Economic Club of Toronto, Empire Club of Canada and Canadian Club 
in Toronto, Canada outside the U of T in 2005 – 2006. Using every free minute in our busy 
research schedules, we discussed all the scientific problems of mutual research interest, aiming 
to find the possible solutions for the challenging research problems in the economics, finances, 
econophysics and econometrics in the time of globalization. 
 Moreover, the second author would like to thank Prof. Roger L. Martin, former Dean at 
the Rotman School of Management for a kind invitation to attend a day-long seminar, which has 
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been organized by the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada 
at the Canadian room at the Fairmont Royal York Hotel in Toronto, Canada on June 3, 2005. 
The second author has been particularly interested in an announced presentation of research on 
the complex interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors within the Canadian 
corporations by Tim Rowley, Professor, Rotman School of Management, Toronto, Canada; 
visiting Professor, INSEAD, France. 
 The second author would like to thank Prof. Roger L. Martin, former Dean at the 
Rotman School of Management for a cordial personal invitation to attend a day-long seminar: 
“Creativity: 21st Century Capital,” which has been organized by the Rotman School of 
Management, Toronto, Canada at the Fairmont Royal York Hotel on June 2, 2006. It was a nice 
opportunity to discuss an increasing role of creativity in the business opportunities widening in 
the XXI century with Mr. Thomas Stewart, former Editor-in-Chief, Harvard Business Review, 
Boston, USA; Prof. Jonathan Feinstein, Yale University, USA; and Prof. Richard Florida, 
Rotman School of Management, Canada. It is necessary to especially highlight a long polemics 
on the numerous examples of creativity in the field of econophysics, which has been conducted 
with Prof. Jonathan Feinstein, Yale University, USA. It makes sense to mention an interesting 
thoughtful conversation on the strategic governance in North America, which has been 
conducted with Prof. Roger L. Martin and cheered by a friendly toast with the two glasses of 
young white wine from the Niagara Fall region in Ontario, Canada. 
It is wonderful to see that Prof. Michael E. Porter, Founding Director, Strategy Institute, 
Harvard Business School, Harvard University finds the enough time to write the numerous 
research articles and books despite of his heavy administrative work load at the Strategy 
Institute, Harvard Business School, Harvard University. As always, we are very grateful to   
Prof. Michael E. Porter, Bishop William Lawrence University Professor and former Dean of 
Harvard Business School, Harvard University, who is considered by the authors as a father of 
the modern business strategy, for his valuable personal efforts and time to write a number of 
interesting informative research articles and books as well as to create the lecture notes, 
providing us with his professional expertise, exceptional quality professional advices and wise 
opinions in the field of competitive strategy in the 21st century. In fact, Prof. Michael E. Porter is 
regarded by the authors as a “guiding star” in the science of strategy. 
Of course, the important groundbreaking research results on the creative disruption and 
evolutionary economics, obtained by Prof. Joseph Alois Schumpeter at the University of Vienna 
in Austria in 1905 – 1908, University of Czernowitz in Ukraine in 1909 – 1911, University of 
Graz in Austria in 1912 – 1914, University of Bonn in Germany in 1925 – 1932, Harvard 
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University in the USA in 1932 – 1950, had a considerable enigmatic influence on the presented 
research opinions by the authors. The first author’s visit to University of Czernowitz in Ukraine 
in March 2015 is just a clear confirmation of the above statements. As we all know, the ideas on 
the creative destruction have been further researched by Prof. Clayton M. Christensen, Kim B. 
Clark University Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard 
University and other notable scientists, hence we studied and absorbed the modern research 
approaches and findings on the creative destruction by Clayton M. Christensen as well. Let us 
say that Prof. Clayton M. Christensen presents the Scandinavian approach to the understanding 
of the research problem on the creative disruption and evolutionary economics. 
The authors would like to highlight a fact that Prof. Michael C. Jensen’s research papers 
made a considerable influence on the formation of the author’s research approaches and 
opinions on the theory of firm. Therefore, it is nice to see that Prof. Michael C. Jensen’s, 
Chairman, Social Sciences Research Networks, NY, USA continues his active research work and 
plays an important role in the global economics research by chairing the Social Sciences 
Research Networks, which is a truly global organization in our time. 
Developing the understanding on a number of complex research problems in the theory of 
the firm, the organizational forms, the agency problems, the investment decisions, the authors 
tried to read and understand the brilliant research ideas by Prof. Eugene Fama, Chicago 
University, USA. Presently, the authors would like to say that it is possible to understand the 
most innovative ideas on the theory of firm by Prof. Eugene Fama, because of his simple 
language and clear logics used to describe complex research problems in the research papers. 
Recently, the second author had a wonderful opportunity to discuss some research 
problems on the interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in the 
publicly traded and non-traded firms in New York in the USA with Charles K. Whitehead, 
Professor of Business Law, Cornell University Law School, New York, USA at V. N. Karazin 
Kharkiv National University in Kharkiv, Ukraine in December, 2014. Therefore, the second 
author expresses his personal thanks to Charles K. Whitehead for the six informative invited 
lectures on the M&A corporate deals, dynamics of the boards of directors, and legal aspects of 
corporate governance in New York in the USA. 
It is not conceivable to write this research article without the multiple useful research 
inputs from and encouragements by our Friends. Indeed, playing the tennis at the tennis courts 
or the golf at the golf play grounds with our research collaborators, business partners, friends in 
various developing and developed countries around the World frequently, we have already 
conducted many thousands of thoughtful discussions on various research topics, hence we would 
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like to thank all our global Friends for their brilliant ideas, interesting opinions, wise 
suggestions and shared experiences on the subject of our research interest in the economics and 
finances. 
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